TaiLexi AI U.S. Case Law

Bracht v. San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railway Co.

Bracht v. San Antonio & Aransas Pass Railway Company

Bracht v. San Antonio & Aransas Pass Ry. Co., 254 U.S. 489 (1921)
Download
Format
Include

Star paging (*137) is kept for pin cites.

Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided
January 3, 1921
Docket
No. 118
Judges
McReynolds
Citations
254 U.S. 48941 S. Ct. 15065 L. Ed. 3661921 U.S. LEXIS 1891
Syllabus
Where, in the contemplation of the parties and by the terms of the bill of lading, a shipment is purely intrastate and neither the bill nor any-state regulation gives a right to divert or reship, the action of the shipper and connecting carrier in forwarding the goods, after arrival at destination, to a new destination in another State under a new bill can not impress the original shipment with an interstate character, subject it to the Interstate Commerce Act and interstate tariffs, and so render the initial carrier liable under the Carmack Amendment for damage occurring under the new coru signment. 200 Mo. App. 655, affirmed.
Summary
CERTIORARI TO THE KANSAS. CITY COURT OP APPEALS QF THE STATE OP MISSOURI. The case is stated in the opinion.

Syllabus and headnotes are prepared by the reporter or publisher, not the court, and are not part of the opinion.

Opinion — McReynolds

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court.

June 10, 1915, the petitioner delivered to respondent Railway Company at Ingléside, Texas, a carload of vegetables consigned tó himsélf at Dallas, Texas, a point off its lines, where he intended to sell them. He accepted a bill of ladingjipon the face of which was plainly printed— “For use only between points within thé State of Texas.”

*490 It contained no reference to a diversion or reshipment; and the record discloses no rule or regulation by the state statutes or authorities on that subject.

The car inoved over respondent’s road to Waco and then over the M. K. & T. Railway to Dallas, where it appears to have arrived promptly with contents in good condition. Upon petitioner’s request, made after such arrival, the M. K. & T. Railway forwarded the car to Kansas City over its own lines, took up the original bill of lading and issued an interstate one acknowlédging receipt of the vegetables at Dallas! When the car reached Kansas City the contents were in bad condition and thereupon petitioner sued respondent as the initial carrier claiming a right to recover damages under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act ( 34 Stat. 584 , c. 3591).

The court below held that the provisions in interstate, tariffs permitting reconsignment or change of destination did not apply, that the carrier only agreed to transport, to Dallas and was not liable for damage sustained beyond that point.

Respondent’s contract appears to have related only to a movement between points in the same'-State. It had no notice or'reason to suppose that the freight would pass beyond the destination specified. The original undertaking was an intrastate transaction, subject, of course,- to any applicable rules and regulations prescribed by state authority. The record discloses none; and we are unable to say as matter of federal law that the tariff schedules for interstate shipments or the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act constituted part of the agreement. The general' principles announced in Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co.

v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 411 , are applicable.

Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S., 101 ;

Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111 , and similar cases are not *491 controlling. They involved controversies concerning carriage between points in the same State which was really but part of an interstate or foreign movement reasonably to be anticipated by the contracting parties —a recognized step towards a destination outside the State. The distinctions are elucidated in Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co.

v. Sabine Tram Co.

Here neither shipper nor respondent had in contemplation any movement beyond the point specified and the contract between them must be determined from the original bill of lading and the local laws and regulations.

Affirmed.

How later courts describe this case

Explanatory parentheticals written by citing courts — 2 in all; the most informative distinct ones are shown.

Cited by 12 cases

View all citing references →
1921: 21922: 11923: 11924: 11926: 31927: 11929: 11930: 12000: 119212026peak 1926 · 3

Relies on it most ⓘ

  1. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey12 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1926)
  2. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Lee14 F.2d 439 (E.D.N.C. 1926)
  3. Taylor v. Central of Georgia Railway Co.121 S.E. 348 (Ga. Ct. App. 1923)
  4. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Mars14 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. App. 1929)
  5. Cott v. Erie R.R. Co.131 N.E. 737 (N.Y. 1921)
  6. Rice v. Oregon Short Line Railroad198 P. 161 (Idaho 1921)

Citing references are not a citator: they show that a later opinion cites this case, not whether it followed, distinguished, or overruled it. Check negative history before relying on this case.

Authorities cited 3

DepthCaseCited by
Tex. & New Orleans R.R. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111 (1913) 203
Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Texas, 204 U.S. 403 (1907) 111
R.R. Comm'n of Ohio v. Worthington, Receiver of Wheeling & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 225 U.S. 101 (1912) 108

Keyboard shortcuts

/Focus the search box
j kNext / previous result
EnterOpen the selected result
xAdd / remove the selected result from the download list
n pNext / previous search term in a case
cCopy the citation of the current case
+ −Larger / smaller reading text
?Show this list