apply, and the physician is liable for any results growing out of the want of ordinary skill and care on his part.

The first part states the ordinary rule as to the negligence of the plaintiff; the second states the proper limitation of the rule.

the physician from liability for his distinct negligence, and the separate injury occasioned thereby.

The sections of the laws referred to by him authorize a city, in the same language that the powers are conferred, which were exercised in this case, to maintain a police,- organize fire companies, and employ a physician for the poor

The principle which would hold the defendant liable for the negligent acts here complained of, would compel a city to respond in damages for the neglect of its police to sup *499 press a riot, the failure of its firemen to arrest a

conflagration, and the negligence of its physician in prescribing for a patient.

complains, vex-y generally carries .with it prima facie proof of negligexxce and unskilfulness, and it is for the defendaxxt to show that the injui’ies were the 'result of inevitable accident, or that they were occasioned hy the negligence

And then generally, if a patient should send for a physician, under the apprehension that his limb has been impropexdy set, and under the belief that it will be useless to him, requests the physician to re-break that limb, it is a

The principle is quite analogous to that which prevents a recovery for injuries consequent upon unskilful or negligent treatment by a physician, if the plaintiff’s own negligence directly contributed to them. Hibbard v.

Actions against tradesmen, doctors, innkeepers for negligence, are all based on *72 contract, either express or implied, and though they are called actions on the case, they require for their support, proof of such a state of facts

Physicians: liability of: negligence. *288 II.

This was an action by the appellant against the appellee to recover damages for the alleged negligent and unskilful treatment, by the defendant, as a physician and surgeon, of the plaintiff’s arm and hand, which had been crushed and

It is not insisted or claimed, so far as we can discover by the record, that appellants are not properly educated and skilled in their profession, but it is claimed that the injury resulted from their negligent and unskillful treatment

The evidence shows that these physicians were both graduates of medical colleges, and had been engaged in the practice of their profession for many years, and were not wanting in the ordinary skill of the profession.

So also the loss of time and actual expenses incurred in consequence of the fault, want of skill, or negligence of the physician.

The action is against a physician and surgeon for negligence in the treatment of a dislocation of the elbow of the plaintiff. The case has been several times tried, and has been once to the Court of Appeals.

Now, it is to be observed, that the jury have found that the defendant’s negligence produced the hernia. The attending physicians did not produce the hernia. They only failed, by mistake, to reduce it.

To the same effect is Wharton on Negligence (§ 131, et seq.). Now the calling in of a physician, and his action, cannot properly constitute the intervention of a new force of itself, or the independent act of a third person.

Means, in the circuit court of Marion county, against appellants, to recover damages for the unskillful and negligent manner in which they, as physicians and surgeons, treated a broken leg of appellee.

The Erie Railway ( 57 N.Y., 489 ), the Commission of Appeals held, if one who is injured by the negligence of another, acts in good faith under the advice of a competent physician, even if it is erroneous, he may recover, and that

Y., 489 ), the Commission of Appeals held, if one who is injured by the negligence of another, acts in good faith under the advice of a competent physician, even if it is erroneous, he may recover, and that the error is no shield to

violently sick, and was confined to his bed; before default was taken he partially recovered, and was able to inform Nourse that they had been employed in this suit, but failed to *93 do so; tlie question is whether he was guilty of negligence

In regard to his condition, his physician testifies as follows: “He (Kauffman) was delirious part of the time; he was not competent to attend to business; I prohibited him from attending to business, or parties from talking to him

He alleges that the plaintiff, during the latter part of the year 1872, and particularly-during the month of January, 1873, became negligent in the performance of his duties as defendant’s 'miller; that he established himself as a

practicing physician in the town of Fredericksburg; that he unnecessarily absented' himself from the mill, in disregard of his duties and obligations under said contract; that at sundry and divers times, and particularly in the latter

The plaintiff’s injuries having been caused by a defective highway for which the defendants were in fault, the plaintiff is entitled to recover all damages resulting therefrom, unless such damages resulted in part from his own negligence

The degree of care and prudence required to be exercised by the plaintiff in the selection of a physician and surgeon, and the means used for his recovery and cure from his injuries, are the same as a traveller upon the highway is

This was an action brought by the plaintiff against the defendants, as physicians and surgeons, who undertook to amputate the leg of the plaintiff’s son, and did it in such an unskillful and negligent manner as to cause his death,

Scott, 25 Ohio St. 86 , that actions against physicians or sui’geons, founded on their *249 professional unskillfulness or negligence, are controlled, in respect to contributory negligence of the plaintiff, by the principles applicable

Appellant claims that, if the blow struck plaintiff on the side, then he was manifestly standing so as to present his sides to the way car and engine, which was unusual, unsafe and negligent, and that if the physician from his examination