This is an action for alleged negligence, originally brought against a physician and after his death defended by his administrator.

The burden was on the plaintiff to establish a causal connection between negligence of the doctor and his injury; that is, to prove that an act or omission of the doctor caused the injury and also that such act or omission was negligent

This would not warrant the inference that the doctor had employed “.caustic” or that its use in such an operation was improper or negligent.

The first question as to them appears in the margin 4 and inquires as to whether there is in Massachusetts a cause of action against a physician for negligent preconception genetic counseling.

The almost universal rule in this country is that a physician is not liable to a child who was born because of the physician’s negligence. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978); Lininger v.

Any “wrongfulness” lies not in the life, the birth, the conception, or the pregnancy, but in the negligence of the physician.

The Appeals Court recognized that “[t]he case law in other jurisdictions does not clearly establish a single rule for when treatment by an associated doctor can be imputed to the alleged negligent doctor.” Parr, 87 Mass. App.

treatment, especially where the physician providing the continuing care effectively brought the allegedly negligent physician onto the team.

Where a physician has acted negligently in the patient’s treatment, the benefit of promoting the continuation of that relationship is questionable.

Doctor-patient relationship. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant was negligent in irradiating her to the point of causing radiation necrosis.

The plaintiff argues that, even if there was no doctor-patient relationship, the defendant is liable vicariously for the negligence of the treating physicians under a theory of respondeat superior.

under a collective name, might be liable vicariously for negligence of other doctors in the same practice.

Can a physician escape suit to decide whether negligence on his part has caused damage to a patient, because that patient has been paid compensation under G.

Thomas, 262 Mass. 383 , that an injured employee who has received compensation under the act cannot maintain an action against a physician whose negligence has aggravated his original injury.

L. c. 152, payment of such compensation, and pain and suffering resulting to the employee from alleged negligent acts of a physician who treated the employee for the injury, the insurer stated a case.

The second question, if there was evidence of negligence by a physician, was whether that negligence caused harm to Bradford. See Perez v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., supra; Blood v. Lea, supra; Kapp v.

The liability of Baystate in this case solely depends on proof of its vicarious responsibility for the negligence of either or both physicians. 5 We first consider whether there was evidence that Dr.

On the other hand, there is reason to question a rule of law that would totally exonerate a negligent physician from tort liability when the patient had a fair, but less than even, chance of survival if the physician had not been negligent

conduct causes the plaintiff to be treated by a physician wisely chosen by the plaintiff and if the physician is negligent in his therapy, such professional malpractice is not an intervening cause and the defendant is liable for the

“The law is well settled that, in an action of tort for negligence causing bodily injury, the negligence of a physician, properly chosen, in treating that injury does not destroy the causal connection between that injury and the consequent

We see no reason why the rule should not apply to physicians whose original negligence causes the intervention of a second physician who either improperly diagnoses the case and performs an unnecessary operation or makes a proper diagnosis

He has presumably concluded that a physician may properly be held liable if his negligent performance of a sterilization procedure permits conception.

but for whose negligence the child would not have been conceived.

If a physician is negligent in caring for a newborn child, damage calculations would tie made concerning the newborn’s earning capacity and expected medical expenses over an entire lifetime.

Instead, as the Carter court declared: “there is no reason why [negligence] should not apply to physicians whose original negligence causes the intervention of a second physician who [ ] improperly diagnoses the case . . .”

The negligence of the second or subsequent physicians can be a foreseeable risk of the originating Dr.

Metcalf and she can be held liable (and her employer, vicariously so), even if the subsequent treating physicians are also found to be negligent. Their negligence would not render Dr.

DISCUSSION It is well settled in Massachusetts, that “a physician is not liable to a child who was born because of the physician’s negligence.” Viccaro v. Murphy, 406 Mass. 777, 783 (1990) (citations omitted).

However, Massachusetts does permit the parents of a child born with a congenital or genetic disorder to recover against a negligent physician. Viccaro, supra at 780-81 .

physician for extraordinary expenses.

acts of a physician.

Steinberg, 395 Mass. 666 (1985), the test of vicarious liability is still one of control or right of control by the employer (i.e., hospital or HMO) over the actual conduct by the physician (employee) alleged to be negligent.

Surprisingly little case law exists on the liability of HMOs for the negligence of their participating physicians.

this Commonwealth, and in many other jurisdictions, that in an action for personal injuries arising out of the alleged negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the injuries resulting from the defendant’s negligence

although such injuries are aggravated by thé negligence of an attending physician if, in his selection and employment, the plaintiff was in the exercise of reasonable care.

The reason why a wrongdoer is held liable for the negligence of a physician whose unskilful treatment aggravates an injury, is that such unskilful treatment is a result which reasonably ought to have been anticipated by him.

.: “Nor would it have been material, if that had been found to be the fact, that the bedsore was due to the mistake or the negligence of the physicians acting honestly.”

Seelye, 231 Mass. 434 , at page 437, that “The reason why a wrongdoer is held liable for the negligence of a physician whose unskilful treatment aggravates an in *387 jury, is that such unskilful treatment is a result which reasonably

At common law it is well settled that in an action for personal injury a party may recover for injuries resulting from the defendant’s negligence even though such injuries are aggravated by the mistaken but honest treatment of a physician

If such a photograph was essential in order to discover the fracture, and the physician, in the exercise of that degree of care required of him, advised that it be taken and the patient refused this advice, the physician cannot be

charged with negligence.

The patient cannot charge the physician with negligence if the patient himself refuses to carry out the directions because ignorant of the consequences which might result from such failure.

On June 11, a verdict was returned on special questions that neither doctor was negligent with respect to Mrs.

Footit or her stillborn child, and that no negligence of either doctor was the proximate cause of the illness or death of Mrs. Footit or the death of her unborn child.

If there was no negligence on the part of the defendant doctors, as the jury clearly found, their negligence could not have been the proximate cause of any harm to Mrs. Footit or *181 to her child.

The law is well settled that, in an action of tort for negligence causing bodily injury, the negligence of a physician, properly chosen, in treating that injury does not destroy the causal connection between that injury and the consequent

apply, and the physician is liable for any results growing out of the want of ordinary skill and care on his part.

The first part states the ordinary rule as to the negligence of the plaintiff; the second states the proper limitation of the rule.

the physician from liability for his distinct negligence, and the separate injury occasioned thereby.

This tort action was commenced against the defendant doctor (doctor) and the Joseph P. Kennedy Memorial Hospital (hospital) based on a claim of negligent treatment of Duane Kelley in March, 1982.

The plaintiff claims that the doctor and the hospital were negligent in failing promptly to diagnose the boy’s condition and to advise his parents of it.

Because the plaintiff’s claim arises from the alleged negligence of the doctor in the emergency room, we must focus on those facts tending to show that, while working in the hospital’s emergency room, the doctor was not subject to

This action is brought to recover not for alleged negligence of the doctor but for alleged negligence in maintaining the premises in an unsafe condition.

When the negligence of physicians or nurses has been charged against the hospital, the defendant has been held not liable in other cases on the ground that the relation of master and servant does not exist. Schloendorff v.

There are a few decisions which hold the hospital responsible for negligence of the managers in selecting physicians and servants, although not responsible for the negligence of physicians and servants when carefully selected.