Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP
Stanley KOLBE, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, LP, D/B/A Bank of America, N.A.; Balboa Insurance Company, Defendants, Appellees
Opinion of the Court
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.
This putative class action is one of a number of breach-of-contract suits being brought against financial institutions nationwide by mortgagors who claim that they were improperly forced to increase flood insurance coverage on their properties. 1 The plaintiff in this case, Stanley Kolbe, asserts that Bank of America’s demand that he increase his flood coverage by $46,000 breached both the terms of his mortgage contract and the contract’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court concluded that the pertinent provision of the mortgage unambiguously permitted the lender to require the increased flood coverage and, hence, it granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.
Having closely examined the mortgage language at issue and the relevant context, we are persuaded that the mortgage is reasonably susceptible to an understanding that supports Kolbe’s breach of contract and implied covenant claims. We *114 therefore vacate the judgment of dismissal in favor of the Bank. 2
I.
The following facts are drawn from the allegations in the complaint. See Román-Oliveras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir.2011). In October 2008, appellant Kolbe borrowed $197,437 from a mortgage company to finance the purchase of his home in Atlantic City, New Jersey. The loan is guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”), an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), and Kolbe’s mortgage in all material respects tracks the FHA’s Model Mortgage Form for single-family homes. See FHA Single Family Origination Handbook -4165.1, App’x II, available at http://www.hud.gov/ offices/adm/hudclips/handbooks/hsgh/4165. l/41651hbHSGH.doc (last visited Sept. 18, 2012); see also 24 C.F.R. § 203.17 (a)(2)® (stating that FHA mortgages “shall be in a form meeting the requirements of the [Federal Housing] Commissioner”). Paragraph 4 of both the model mortgage form and Kolbe’s agreement describes the borrower’s obligation to maintain hazard insurance, in pertinent part, as follows:
4. Fire, Flood and Other Hazard Insurance. Borrower shall insure all improvements on the Property, whether now in existence or subsequently erected, against any hazards, casualties, and contingencies, including fire, for which Lender requires insurance. This insuranee shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender requires. Borrower shall also insure all improvements on the Property, whether now in existence or subsequently erected, against loss by floods to the extent required by the Secretary [of HUD].
Federal law required Kolbe to obtain flood insurance because his property is located in an area designated as a special flood hazard zone under the National Flood Insurance Act (“NFIA”). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 . 3 The minimum amount of such insurance also is mandated by law. Under the NFIA, the flood coverage for a residential property securing a mortgage issued by a federally regulated lender must be in an amount at least equal to the outstanding principal balance of the loan, or $250,000, whichever is less. Id. §§ 4012a(b)(l), 4013(b)(2); 24 C.F.R. § 203 .16a; 44 C.F.R. § 61.6 . Kolbe’s complaint states that he purchased coverage in an unspecified amount in excess of the minimum. See Compl. ¶ 26.
In August 2009, Kolbe’s original mortgage company went bankrupt, and appellee Bank of America took over Kolbe’s loan. 4 Through appellee Balboa Insurance Company, the Bank sent Kolbe notices in October and November 2009 stating that he was required to increase his flood insurance by $46,000 so that the total coverage would equal the replacement cost of his property as identified in his homeowner’s insurance policy. The Bank warned that it *115 would purchase the additional insurance itself, at an estimated cost to Kolbe of $237, if he did not acquire the insurance by December 6. The Bank further advised that the insurance it would purchase— commonly known as “force-placed” or “lender-placed” insurance, see, e.g., Williams v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 398 Fed.Appx. 44, 45 (5th Cir.2010) (per curiam) — might cost more and would likely be less comprehensive than coverage Kolbe could obtain on his own. In response to these notices, Kolbe bought the additional $46,000 in flood insurance.
In February 2011, Kolbe filed this action against Bank of America and Balboa on behalf of himself and others similarly situated for breach of the mortgage contract and breach of the contract’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. He claimed that his mortgage contract did not permit the Bank to demand increased coverage, and he alleged that the Bank had implemented a nationwide policy of compelling borrowers to maintain greater flood insurance than required by their mortgages or federal law. Kolbe’s complaint asserted that the Bank was profiting from this improper policy because it often arranged for force-placed insurance to be purchased through its own affiliated companies and brokers.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Paragraph 4 of the mortgage unambiguously gives the lender the discretion to determine the amount of flood insurance the borrower must carry. In its written decision, the district court agreed that the hazard-insurance provision can only be reasonably interpreted to afford discretion to the lender. The court concluded that the reference to “any hazards” in the first sentence of the paragraph encompasses flooding, 5 and, consequently, it held that the second sentence gives the lender the right to require that flood insurance, like other types of hazard coverage, “be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that [the] Lender requires.” The court then considered the paragraph’s third sentence, which explicitly refers to flood insurance, and held that it “merely specifies the required minimum coverage for flood insurance” under federal law — i.e., it imposes a floor on the Bank’s discretion to set the amount of flood insurance.
On appeal, Kolbe insists that Paragraph 4 addresses flood insurance solely by means of the third sentence — which explicitly references such coverage — and not by means of the generally phrased “all hazards” language in the first sentence. Alternatively, he maintains that this understanding is one of two reasonable constructions of the paragraph. Kolbe asserts that his interpretation supports his claim that the Bank breached the mortgage agreement and violated the contract’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by compelling him (and others similarly situated) to purchase flood insurance in excess of the outstanding loan balance. Hence, Kolbe argues that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim.
II.
The issue in this case is one of straightforward contract interpretation. Appellant Kolbe asserts that the hazard and flood insurance sentences in Paragraph 4 are independent and, indeed, mutually ex- *116 elusive. Appellees maintain that the flood insurance sentence is subordinate to the general hazard sentence, merely limiting the Bank’s discretion by incorporating the minimum coverage required by federal law. Kolbe, in other words, argues that the contract does not permit the Bank to demand insurance beyond the amount “required by the Secretary,” while appellees argue that the Bank may require any amount so long as the Secretary’s minimum is met.
Whether the contract language at issue here is ambiguous is a question of law, Nye v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 783 F.Supp.2d 751, 759 (D.N.J.2011), 6 and, accordingly, our review of the district court’s interpretation is de novo, Sumitomo Mach. Corp. of Am., Inc. v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 81 F.3d 328, 332 (3d Cir.1996). 7 A contract is ambiguous if it “is susceptible of more than one meaning or if it is subject to reasonable alternative interpretations.” United States v. Pantelidis, 335 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir.2003) (citation omitted) (internal quotation, marks omitted); see also Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 195 N.J. 231 , 948 A.2d 1285, 1289 (2008). Under New Jersey law, extrinsic evidence of context may be considered in determining ambiguity if “such evidence provides ‘objective indicia that, from the linguistic reference point of the parties, the terms of the contract are susceptible of different meanings.’ ” Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Fermenta Animal Health Co., 54 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 (3d Cir.1980)). We must “consider all of the relevant evidence that will assist in determining the intent and meaning of the contract.” Conway v. 287 Corporate Ctr. Assocs., 187 N.J. 259 , 901 A.2d 341, 346 (2006); see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 159 (3d Cir.1996) (stating that New Jersey law requires “courts [to] interpret a contract considering ‘the objective intent manifested in the language of the contract in light of the circumstances surrounding the transaction’ ” (quoting Dome Petroleum Ltd. v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 767 F.2d 43, 47 (3d Cir.1985))).
A. Breach of Contract
1. The Language
Kolbe argues that the first three sentences of Paragraph 4 plainly address hazard insurance and flood insurance separately — with hazard insurance covered by the first two sentences and flood insurance covered by the third — and that only the amount of hazard insurance is left to the discretion of the lender. For convenience, we again reproduce the pertinent language in full:
4. Fire, Flood and Other Hazard Insurance. Borrower shall insure all improvements on the Property, whether now in existence or subsequently erected, against any hazards, casualties, and contingencies, including fire, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender requires. Borrower shall also insure all improvements on the Property, whether now in existence or subsequently erect *117 ed, against loss by floods to the extent required by the Secretary [of HUD].
Multiple characteristics of the provision suggest that Kolbe’s interpretation is correct. Importantly, the paragraph is structured to address two different categories of insurance, -with the first and third sentences containing identical introductory language directing the borrower to insure “all improvements on the Property, whether now in existence or subsequently erected.” The repetition arguably denotes two parallel statements of coverage, each establishing a particular coverage requirement for the same property. The first two sentences also are distinct from the third because they address insurance required by the lender, while the third sentence addresses insurance required by the Secretary. The second sentence, referring to “This insurance,” is written as a modification of the first sentence, addressing the required amount of the previously identified form of insurance. By contrast, the next sentence, referring to flood coverage, contains its own specification of amount— “the extent required by the Secretary.”
The view that Paragraph 4 imposes independent requirements for hazard and flood insurance is lent force by the title for the paragraph, which breaks out “fire” and “flood” from all other hazards. Each of those two specifically identified hazards is then explicitly referenced, separately, in one of the two parallel sentences. The fact that both “fire” and “flood” are mentioned in the title, but the “all hazards” sentence refers only to “fire,” further supports the view that the flood coverage was handled by the separate, linguistically parallel third sentence.
Moreover, the word “also” in the flood-insurance sentence reinforces the independence of the two requirements by suggesting a separate, additional obligation — i.e., in addition to the hazard insurance that is left to the lender’s discretion for most types of hazards, the debtor must obtain flood insurance in the requisite amount. Indeed, if the flood-insurance sentence were meant merely to limit the discretion afforded in the prior sentence, it arguably would have been framed in direct relation to that sentence. For example, it could have said: “Notwithstanding any requirements of the Lender, flood insurance must be obtained as required by the Secretary.” The sentence as drafted, however, is not framed as a qualification on the previous sentence, but as an independent, further requirement.
Bank of America argues that the first sentence in Paragraph 4, which applies generally to coverage against “hazards, casualties, and contingencies,” must be understood to include flood insurance because flooding is embraced by any reasonable understanding of those terms. Thus, the Bank asserts, the mortgage contract allows it to demand flood coverage as it chooses pursuant to the sentence stating that the hazard (or casualty or contingency) insurance “shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender requires.” The third sentence, according to the Bank, minimally cabins its discretion by requiring flood insurance at least “to the extent required by the Secretary.”
We think appellant has the better argument based on the language and format of the paragraph. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the Bank’s interpretation can also be deemed reasonable. Floods unquestionably are a type of hazard, and they are thus literally within the scope of the first sentence. Moreover, the third sentence can be reasonably understood to declare the borrower’s obligation to obtain flood insurance as required by the NFIA regardless of whether the lender requires any other form of hazard insurance, but *118 not to override the lender’s exercise of discretion to require more.
Because the language is not decisive, we consider what the available extrinsic evidence tells us about the meaning of the provision.
2. The Extrinsic Evidence
As a preliminary matter, we note that the mortgage and certain public materials outside the complaint may properly be part of our inquiry in reviewing the district court’s disposition of a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir.2008) (stating that a district court may consider “documents incorporated by reference [in the complaint], matters of public record, and other matters susceptible to judicial notice” without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). We therefore refer liberally to publicly available HUD materials.
The debate over the clarity of Paragraph 4 centers on whether the reference to “any hazards” may reasonably be read to exclude the serious hazard of flooding. Kolbe argues that flood damage ordinarily is not covered by standard homeowners’ hazard insurance policies, and that it therefore is reasonable to conclude that such coverage is excluded from the mortgage contract’s hazard insurance requirement. The Bank responds that the absence of any explicit exclusion for flood coverage in the “any hazards” sentence is the best evidence that flooding is a hazard within the meaning of that sentence.
Kolbe’s view is advanced by the distinctive treatment routinely given to flood insurance by HUD, the agency responsible for FHA programs. Kolbe’s mortgage contract contains standard HUD language specifying the mortgagor’s insurance obligations. 8 Appellant points out that HUD’s handbook for the “Administration of Insured Home Mortgages” treats hazard insurance and flood insurance separately. For example, in a list of items linked to a home sale that must be escrowed, hazard insurance is listed as the first item and flood insurance is listed as the sixth item. See HUD Handbook 4330.1, ch. 2, § 2-1(D), available at http://portal.hud.gov/ hudportal/HUD ? src=/progr am_offices/ administration/hudclips/handbooks/hsgh/ 4330.1 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012). The HUD handbook also contains a section labeled “Payment of Bills and Taxes from Escrow Accounts” that lists the two types of coverage separately. See id. ch. 2, § 2-8(D) (Hazard Insurance) & (E) (Flood Insurance); see also id. at § 2-ll(E) (separately listing “Dwelling Insurance,” “Flood Insurance,” and “Homeowner’s Policies” under “Types of Coverage”). Similarly, HUD’s sample settlement statement for a home purchase separately itemizes “Hazard Insurance Premium” on Line 903 and “Flood Insurance” on Line 904. See “Buying Your Home” (June 1997), Section III, available at http://portal.hud.gov/ hudportal/documents/huddoe?id=DOC_ 12893.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
HUD’s practice of treating flood coverage separately reflects Congress’s specific concern about such insurance, which led to the enactment of the NFIA in 1968. Following years of major floods that required “unforeseen disaster relief measures and .,. placed an increasing burden on the Nation’s resources,” Congress identified a widespread gap in private flood insurance coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (a); see also *119 H.R.Rep. No. 90-1585 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2873, 2966-2967 (noting that “[h]eavy losses over the years from hurricanes in the coastal areas and from storms in inland areas of the Nation dramatize the lack of insurance protection against flood damage”). The legislators found that it was “uneconomic” for private insurers to make flood insurance available “on reasonable terms and conditions,” 42 U.S.C. § 4001 (b)(1), and they sought to bridge the gap through a cooperative program between the federal government and the insurance industry, id. § 4001(b)(2). 9 Thus, in effect, Congress found that floods were not customarily among the hazards protected by standard homeowners’ insurance policies. See Mitchell F. Crusto, The Katrina Fund: Repairing Breaches in Gulf Coast Insurance Levees, 43 Harv. J. on Legis. 329 , 335 (2006) (“The insurance industry has generally excluded flood damage in a homeowners policy because flood insurance is not commercially viable.”); US Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO 07-1078, National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA’s [Federal Emergency Management Agency] Management and Oversight of Payments for Insurance Company Services Should be Improved, at 8 (2007) (noting that “flooding is generally excluded from homeowner policies that typically cover damage from other losses, such as wind, fire, and theft”). 10
HUD’s practice of treating flood insurance independently is pertinent to our interpretation of Paragraph 4 of the FHA’s model language, see Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258 , 920 A.2d 73, 78 (2007) (noting that the terms of a contract are to be examined “in light of the common usage and custom”); Kearny PBA Local No. 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208 , 405 A.2d 393, 400 (1979) (listing custom and usage among the “interpretative devices” for discovering contractual intent), and Kolbe’s interpretation has particular force where, as here, the mortgage separately addresses flood-insurance coverage. By contrast, if there were no explicit reference to flooding as a specific harm requiring insurance coverage, the assertion that flooding is not embraced by a reference to “any hazards” would be considerably less potent. That was the situation in Custer v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 858 So.2d 233 (Ala.2003), on which the district court relied in rejecting the ambiguity of the language in Kolbe’s mortgage. 11 The explicit attention to flood *120 insurance in Kolbe’s mortgage materially distinguishes that case from this one.
The Bank, however, reasonably asserts that it makes no sense to read floods out of the “any hazards” sentence because it would be unreasonable to bar a mortgage provider from requiring more than the limited amount of insurance required by federal law, i.e., the amount of the outstanding loan balance. It argues that lenders have an interest in ensuring the long-term performance of mortgage loans by protecting the replacement value of the property, as it sought to do in this instance. It cites FEMA guidelines advising lenders to require replacement-value insurance. See Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, National Flood Insurance Program: Mandatory Purchase of Flood Insurance Guidelines 27-28 (2007), available at http://www.fema.gov/library/view Record.do?id=2954 (last visited Sept. 18, 2012). Interagency guidance makes explicit that lenders may demand more flood insurance coverage than is required by law, stating that “[e]aeh lender has the responsibility to tailor its own flood insurance policies and procedures to suit its business needs and protect its ongoing interest in the collateral.” 74 Fed. Reg. 35914 , 35936 (July 21, 2009), 2009 WL 2143410 (F.R.) (Question 16); 12 see also Notice, Loans in Areas Having Special Flood Hazards, 76 Fed. Reg. 64175 , 64182 (Oct. 17, 2011) (Question 9) (noting that, “[i]n cases involving certain residential ... properties, insurance policies should be written to, and the insurance loss payout would be the equivalent of, [replacement cost]”).
We acknowledge that lenders may have good reason to require full replacement coverage. Nonetheless, in mandating minimum coverage in an amount “equal to the outstanding principal balance of the loan,” 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(l), Congress in the NFIA appears to have incorporated an assumption that, at times, a more limited amount of flood insurance may be reasonable and appropriate. The view that the amount of mandatory insurance should be kept to a minimum also is reflected in the insurance coverage section of HUD’s Handbook, which provides that “[t]he mortgagee may not insist on more coverage than is necessary to protect its investment.” HUD Handbook 4330.1, ch. 2, § 2-ll(B), supra. 13
Indeed, it is plausible that the FHA, which prescribes Paragraph 4 as a “uniform convenant[ ] for national use,” App’x at 31 (Kolbe mortgage), would have sought to balance the need for privately funded disaster relief with a concern that insurance costs not become a barrier to home ownership. HUD’s mission, carried out *121 through the FHA and other programs, is in part “to create strong, sustainable, inclusive communities and quality affordable homes for all.” See HUD Mission, http:// portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/ about/mission (last visited Sept. 18, 2012). From the perspective of facilitating “affordable homes,” Paragraph 4 as construed by Kolbe could reasonably be understood to reflect a policy choice to cap mandatory flood insurance at the amount of the outstanding loan balance. 14 See generally S.Rep. No. 87-281 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1923, 1925-26 (discussing amendments to the National Housing Act of 1934 (“NHA”) that, inter alia, created “a new FHA mortgage insurance program” to further “the national housing policy of ‘a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family’ ”); Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1270 (Fed.Cir.2007) (noting that the 1961 amendments were designed to “‘meet[] the housing needs of moderate-income families’ ” (quoting S.Rep. No. 87-281, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1926)).
The dissent invokes the industry practice of limiting “all-risk” policies by means of express flood-exclusion provisions to argue that, absent such an exclusion in the FHA model mortgage, “any hazards” in the first sentence of Paragraph 4 can only reasonably be read to include flooding. That view, however, reflects the dissent’s basic flaw of ignoring the reasonable arguments in Kolbe’s favor. It is plausible that HUD responded to the standard industry practice of treating floods as a distinct hazard by developing a mortgage document that deals with flood coverage separately from the coverage for other hazards.. Indeed, as discussed above, the repetitive format of the “any hazards” and flood-insurance sentences in Paragraph 4 suggests parallel, independent obligations. Hence, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, the general industry practice is no more helpful to the Bank’s position than it is to Kolbe’s. 15
The extrinsic evidence thus leaves us in much the same place as our examination of Paragraph 4’s text and structure. The HUD documents showing that the agency routinely treats hazard and flood insurance independently are persuasive evidence in support of Kolbe’s assertion that Paragraph 4 separately addresses the two types of insurance and fixes the required amount of flood insurance at the statutory minimum amount. At the same time, however, the FEMA guidelines recommending replacement value coverage support the Bank’s view that Paragraph 4 is not reasonably construed to prevent lenders from fully protecting their investments and, hence, must be read to give the lender discretion to increase the requirement above the statutory minimum.
The question, of course, is not what amount of flood insurance a lender reasonably could require, but what this particular HUD mortgage provision in fact permits the lender to demand. See Hofstetter v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 751 F.Supp.2d 1116 , 1127 n. 3 (N.D.Cal.2010) (“Simply *122 because an agency recommends that lenders maintain a certain amount of flood insurance coverage does not mean that lenders have carte blanche to do so without regard to the terms of their loan agreements with borrowers.”). As to that question, we conclude that a rational jury could construe Paragraph 4 in favor of either Kolbe or the Bank. Though the text of Paragraph 4 and the extrinsic evidence both provide strong support for Kolbe’s interpretation, his reading is not the only reasonable one. 16 See Morris v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:11-cv-00474, 2012 WL 3929805 (W.D.Pa. Sept. 7, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss breach of contract claim involving same language) (stating that, “[a]t the very least, plaintiffs interpretation is tenable”); Wulf v. Bank of America, 798 F.Supp.2d 586, 588 (E.D.Pa.2011) (same); Skansgaard v. Bank of America, No. C11-988 RJB, slip op. at 4 (W.D.Wash. Oct. 13, 2011) (same). Kolbe has therefore stated a plausible breach of contract claim, and, hence, the district court erred in dismissing his complaint on the ground that the mortgage unambiguously permitted the Bank to demand the additional $46,000 in coverage. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that “an adequate complaint must provide fair notice to the defendants and state a facially plausible legal claim”) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). 17
B. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Kolbe alleges that the defendants acted in bad faith and consequently breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by demanding flood insurance in an amount in excess of the coverage required by his mortgage. The covenant, implied in every contract in New Jersey, imposes a duty on each party to refrain from “‘destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.’ ” Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396 , 690 A.2d 575, 587 (1997) (quoting Palisades Props., Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117 , 207 A.2d 522, 531 (1965)); see also Kalogeras v. 239 Broad Ave., L.L.C., 202 N.J. 349 , 997 A.2d 943, 953 (2010); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).
The New Jersey Supreme Court has described good faith conduct as “conduct that does not ‘violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness,’ ” Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 182 *123 N.J. 210 , 864 A.2d 387, 395 (2005) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Restatement (Second,) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a), and that is “ ‘consistent] with the justified expectations of the other party,’ ” Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 , 773 A.2d 1121, 1126 (2001) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a). In New Jersey, a showing of “ ‘bad motive or intention’ is vital to an action for breach of the covenant.” Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, 864 A.2d at 396 (quoting Wilson, 773 A.2d at 1130 ).
The Bank asserts that no jury could find that the Bank acted in bad faith by taking the objectively reasonable step of requiring insurance in the amount recommended by FEMA. We agree that, given the ambiguity in Paragraph 4, requiring replacement-value coverage would on its own fall short of demonstrating bad faith. Kolbe’s claim, however, does not rest solely on the demand for increased coverage. The Bank warned Kolbe that if he failed to purchase additional coverage, force-placed insurance would be obtained, possibly through entities related to Bank of America, at a premium that “may be more expensive and will likely provide less coverage than ... you can obtain on your own.” App’x at 43 (Notice to Kolbe, Oct. 18, 2009).
This ultimatum could constitute bad faith under either of two scenarios. The first would be if the Bank, notwithstanding our conclusion that Paragraph 4 is ambiguous, had in fact believed that the mortgage required flood insurance coverage only in the amount of the outstanding principal balance of the mortgage (or $250,000, if that were the lower amount) and, hence, did not authorize the Bank’s demand for additional coverage at additional expense to the borrower. Evidence that the Bank made the demand despite this belief, so that it might have the opportunity to gain financially from the purchase of insurance through its related entities, would plainly suggest the “bad motive or intention” that is at the core of a breach of the implied covenant. See Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, 864 A.2d at 396 . A finding of bad faith also would be supportable if the Bank had recognized the ambiguity in Paragraph 4 and, instead of acting out of concern for protecting its security, had seized upon the ambiguity as a money-making opportunity. Again, a decision to demand additional insurance for the purpose of generating business for its affiliated insurance companies, and thereby increase Bank profits, would reflect the improper motive necessary to demonstrate a breach of the covenant of good faith and good dealing.
We conclude that the allegations plausibly support such a contention of improper motivation: Kolbe alleges that the Bank demanded flood insurance in excess of his obligations under the contract, see Compl. ¶¶ 13, 25-26, 32, 18 that it did so in bad *124 faith, id. ¶ 55, 19 and that the Bank or its related entities would profit through the purchase of force-placed insurance, id. ¶¶ 15, 16. 20 These allegations, in effect, amount to a claim that the Bank’s motivation for demanding additional flood insurance coverage was to increase corporate profits by tunneling new coverage to its own affiliates. 21 See, e.g., Abels v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A, 678 F.Supp.2d 1273, 1276, 1278-79 (S.D.Fla.2009) (declining to dismiss claim alleging breach of implied covenant where plaintiffs asserted that defendant “engaged in self-dealing by purchasing insurance from one of its own affiliates”); cf. Artuso v. Vertex Pharm., Inc., 637 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2011) (holding that “plaintiffs implied covenant claims founder because his complaint contains only a threadbare allegation that ‘the defendant terminated [him] in bad faith ... unaccompanied by any factual allegations that might give rise to an inference of bad-faith conduct”). 22
*125 The Bank contends that such a self-dealing claim fails as a matter of law because Kolbe responded to the Bank’s ultimatum by purchasing the insurance himself, and the Bank therefore did not benefit from Kolbe’s acquisition of additional insurance. The Bank cites no cases in support of its implicit contention that bad-faith conduct designed to provide an opportunity for self-dealing cannot constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Jersey law. Kolbe’s decision under duress to avoid the higher cost of force-placed insurance would seem an inadequate defense if the Bank’s motivation were improper. In any event, in the absence of developed argument from the Bank, no more needs to be said on this issue at this early stage of the case.
We thus conclude that the complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is “ ‘plausible on its face,”’ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Hence, the claim should not have been dismissed.
III.
Defendants argue that the district court’s judgment in favor of Balboa should be affirmed even if the complaint is reinstated against Bank of America. We agree. Balboa’s alleged involvement in the matters underlying Kolbe’s lawsuit was limited to preparing and sending the letters notifying Kolbe that he needed to purchase additional flood insurance. See Compl. ¶ 29. Those letters were sent on the letterhead of the Bank’s predecessor, BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP. The complaint is devoid of allegations showing a contractual relationship between Kolbe and Balboa, and Kolbe’s bald assertion that Balboa “acted on its own behalf’ in “all of the actions described herein,” id. ¶ 21, is inadequate to state a plausible claim against the insurer for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 23 Hence, we affirm dismissal of the complaint against Balboa.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs are awarded to the appellant.
So ordered.
. We address another one of these actions in a separate decision also issued today, Lass v. Bank of America, N.A., 695 F.3d 129 (1st Cir.2012).
. Federal jurisdiction in this case is premised on the court’s diversity jurisdiction over class actions alleging aggregated damages in excess of $5 million. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (d).
. Technically, the statute requires the lender to require the borrower to obtain the insurance. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(l).
. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, a wholly owned subsidiary of Bank of America, N.A., was the entity that originally took over the mortgage. BAC has now been merged into the Bank, and we thus refer to the defendant mortgage holder as "Bank of America” or "the Bank.” Defendant Balboa Insurance Company also is a subsidiary of Bank of America. For convenience, we at times refer only to "the Bank” when describing acts allegedly performed by both defendants.
. As reproduced above, the first sentence states: “Borrower shall insure all improvements on the Property, whether now in existence or subsequently erected, against any hazards, casualties, and contingencies, including fire, for which Lender requires insurance.”
. The parties agree that New Jersey law governs the state-law issue of contract interpretation because Kolbe's residence is located there, and Paragraph 14 of the mortgage provides that "federal law and the law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located" govern.
. Our review of a district court's dismissal of a complaint is likewise de novo. See Román-Oliveras, 655 F.3d at 47 .
. Paragraph 4 is one of sixteen “uniform covenants” included in the FHA Model Mortgage Form for single-family homes. See FHA Single Family Origination Handbook 4165.1, App'x II, supra.
.Congress anticipated that the National Flood Insurance Program ("NFIP”) authorized by the NFIA would rely on a pool of insurance companies "to assume a reasonable proportion of responsibility for the adjustment and payment of claims for losses.” 42 U.S.C. § 4051 (a)(2); see also id. § 4011 (authorizing the program). Federal funds would subsidize the program. Id. §§ 4054(a) (directing the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to make periodic payments to the pool to ensure that "flood insurance [is] available on reasonable terms and conditions”); 4055(a) (authorizing reinsurance provided by the government for losses in excess of the pool's assumption of responsibility); see also Suopys v. Omaha Prop. & Cas., 404 F.3d 805, 807 (3d Cir.2005) (noting that "[t]he NFIP is underwritten by the United States Treasury in order to provide flood insurance below actuarial rates”).
. HUD also recognizes the standard industry practice in guidance about flood insurance requirements that is provided on its website:
Generally, homeowner and other property casualty insurance policies do not provide coverage for potential financial loss that may be caused by flooding damage. Many of the private insurance companies are now marketing policies offered by the National Flood Insurance Program along with their own property casualty insurance policies.
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/ program_offices/comm_planning/
environment/review/qa/floodinsurance (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
. The comparable provision in Custer stated:
*120 "7. That [the Mortgagor] will keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the mortgaged property, insured as may be required from time to time by the Mortgagee against loss by fire and other hazards, casualties and contingencies in such amounts and for such periods as may be required by the Mortgagee and will pay promptly, when due, any premiums on such insurance provision for payment of which has not been made hereinbefore.”
Custer, 858 So.2d at 237 (emphasis in original).
. The FHA is not one of the agencies that issued the guidance. They were: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury; the Farm Credit Administration, and the National Credit Union Administration.
. Of course, this statement may not mean that the insurance should be limited to the amount of the outstanding balance because, as discussed above, a lender may deem replacement-value coverage “necessary to protect its investment.”
. Indeed, the model Paragraph 4 used in Kolbe's FHA mortgage does not mandate any insurance for hazards other than floods, as it leaves any such requirement to the lender’s discretion. See HUD Handbook 4330.1, ch. 2, § 2-8(D), supra (“While HUD does not require mortgagors to carry hazard insurance, the mortgage does permit mortgagees to require it.’’).
. It bears repeating that we are reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss. The Bank will have the opportunity to develop a record in support of its position and, if appropriate, to seek summary judgment.
. Indeed, the dissent plausibly marshals support for the Bank’s interpretation of the mortgage language. It fails, however, to give comparable respect to the factors that favor Kolbe’s interpretation.
. Kolbe argues that any ambiguity in the mortgage should be construed against the Bank as the "drafter” of the agreement. The Bank argues in response that the doctrine giving the advantage to the non-drafting party in a dispute over language does not apply where the language at issue is prescribed by law. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206(b) ("The rule that language is interpreted against the party who chose it has no direct application to cases where the language is prescribed by law, as is sometimes true with respect to insurance policies, bills of lading and other standardized documents.”). Kolbe acknowledges that the "FHA required that the Mortgage Agreement conform to its requirements,” Compl. ¶ 18, and we thus reject the doctrine as a basis for judgment against the Bank at this stage of the case. Kolbe remains free to re-argue the issue as warranted upon further development of the facts.
. These paragraphs allege, in pertinent part, as follows:
13. Defendants have a nationwide policy and practice of requiring mortgagors of mortgages on real estate located in geographic areas designated by the United States government as having "special flood hazards” to maintain flood insurance coverage in an amount equal to the lesser of an amount established by Defendants or the maximum flood insurance coverage available under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.... Defendants apply and enforce Defendants' Flood Insurance Coverage Requirement even if it exceeds the mortgagor’s flood insurance coverage obligations and Defendant BAC Home Loans' flood insurance rights under the mortgage agreements.
25. [P]ursuant to the ... provision of the Mortgage Agreement and the applicable FHA regulations, Plaintiff was required to maintain flood insurance coverage for the Property in an amount equal to the lesser of *124 the outstanding balance on the Loan (less estimated land costs) or the $250,000 maximum flood insurance available under the Flood Insurance Act.
26. At all times ... Plaintiff has maintained flood insurance coverage on the Property in excess of the outstanding balance of the Loan.... That flood insurance coverage was greater than the amount of flood insurance that Plaintiff was contractually obligated to maintain on the Property pursuant to the Mortgage Agreement and the above-referenced applicable FHA regulations.
32. Defendants’ requirement that Plaintiff purchase additional flood insurance was neither required by, nor permitted by, the Mortgage Agreement.... [T]he Mortgage Agreement requires Plaintiff to maintain flood insurance coverage of at least the outstanding balance of the Loan less estimated land costs. Plaintiff was already maintaining this level of flood insurance coverage on the Property when the Defendants sent him the October 18 and November 16, 2009 letters. Accordingly, Plaintiff was fully satisfying his flood insurance coverage obligation under the Mortgage Agreement and fully fulfilling the Defendant BAC Home Loans’ flood insurance coverage rights under the Mortgage Agreement.
. Paragraph 55 alleges:
By requiring Plaintiff and the Class to maintain and pay for flood insurance coverage in excess of the coverage required by their mortgage agreements, Defendants acted in bad faith and breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in the mortgage agreements.
. These paragraphs allege:
15. Defendants enforce Defendants’ Flood Insurance Coverage Requirement by demanding that the mortgagors obtain the amount of flood insurance coverage required by Defendants. If the mortgagors fail to comply with Defendants' demand, Defendants purchase flood insurance coverage so that the total insurance coverage on the real estate will meet Defendants’ Flood Insurance Coverage Requirement. Defendants then charge the mortgagors for the cost of that additional insurance by either deducting the insurance premiums from the escrow accounts maintained by the mortgagors with Defendant BAC Home Loans or by increasing the mortgagors’ monthly mortgage payments.
16. Defendants or their corporate subsidiaries or affiliates profit when Defendants buy insurance for mortgagors. Defendants often purchase the insurance from Defendants' own affiliated insurance companies, including Defendant Balboa, and/or place the insurance through Defendants' own affiliated insurance brokers. Defendants’ affiliated insurance brokers receive commissions on these insurance transactions and Defendants' affiliated insurance companies, including Balboa, receive the insurance premiums involuntarily paid by the mortgagors.
. Appellant argues that this alleged self-dealing would breach the implied covenant even if the mortgage gave the Bank the authority to require increased amounts of flood insurance.
. The equivalent allegations in the other flood insurance case we decide today, Lass v. Bank of America, N.A., 695 F.3d 129 , are more explicit. The plaintiff there alleged that the Bank had breached the covenant of good *125 faith and fair dealing by, inter alia, "charging borrowers sham 'costs’ for flood insurance that did not reflect the true cost to Bank of America because a portion of such 'costs' were retained by Bank of America and/or its affiliates (or kicked back to them) as commissions or 'other compensation.’ ” Compl. ¶ 75, App’x at 45.
. Of course, the allegations concerning Balboa’s role in providing force-placed insurance at the Bank’s behest remain relevant to the implied covenant claim against the Bank.
Dissent
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
On October 6, 2008, the plaintiff-appellant Stanley Kolbe took out a $197,437 loan secured by a mortgage on Kolbe’s home in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in an area designated by the government as subject to flooding. The mortgage was guaranteed by an agency within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), and as required, the mortgage used a standard form that had been approved by HUD, 24 C.F.R. § 200.80 (2012). The mortgage contained the following provision:
4. Fire, Flood and Other Hazard Insurance. Borrower shall insure all im *126 provements on the Property, whether now in existence or subsequently erected, against any hazards, casualties, and contingencies, including fire, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender requires. Borrower shall also insure all improvements on the Property, whether now in existence or subsequently erected, against loss by floods to the extent required by the Secretary [of HUD].
The first two sentences, referring to “any hazards, casualties, and contingencies,” empower the lender to set the “amounts and periods” of insurance for all such threats. The third sentence reflects a requirement imposed by the government under a federal program by which it subsidizes flood insurance in flood prone areas: in aid of that program, lenders are restricted in making loans unless the borrower agrees to maintain flood insurance in the minimum amounts set by the government regardless of whether the lender independently requires flood insurance. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4012 (c), 4012a(b)(l) (2006).
When Kolbe’s original mortgage holder went bankrupt in 2009, the mortgage passed into the hands of entities associated with Bank of America (and for convenience we refer only to that bank). Within a couple of months the bank wrote to Kolbe requiring that he purchase an additional $46,000 in flood insurance. The letters advised that if he did not purchase such insurance within a set period, the bank would purchase it for him and charge him for the cost but that this might well be more expensive than if he obtained the insurance on his own behalf.
Kolbe complied, purchasing the insurance out of an escrow account maintained on his behalf by the bank for insurance and similar purposes, and not long after filed the current class action in federal district court. His complaint, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, claimed that it was unlawful for the bank to require flood insurance in any amount exceeding that required by the government under the flood insurance program already mentioned and reflected in the third sentence of the paragraph quoted above.
The district court, without certifying a class, granted the bank’s motion to dismiss. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The court found that the original loan agreement clearly permitted the bank to require more insurance for “any hazard,” the Secretary of HUD’s flood insurance requirement reflecting merely a minimum imposed by the government; and the court ruled that no facts alleged in the complaint about the bank’s motive, or the additional insurance required by the bank, impugned the bank’s good faith. Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 11-10312-NMG, 2011 WL 3665394 (D.Mass. Aug. 18, 2011). This appeal followed.
The insurance required by the government, under the third sentence of the above quoted paragraph 4 in the mortgage, equated to the outstanding unpaid balance on the loan, i.e., $197,437 less whatever payments Kolbe had already made to reduce the principal balance. The additional $46,000 requested by the bank apparently aimed to raise the total insurance to the approximate replacement cost of Kolbe’s house if it were destroyed in a flood — a familiar although not invariable practice in mortgage lending and reflected in government guidance by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. 24
*127 The bank’s interest is obvious enough: it seeks not merely repayment of the outstanding balance but the maintenance of a loan on which it earns the designated interest for the period agreed to — a goal served by providing funds to restore a damaged house that might otherwise be abandoned. Further, despite the mortgage and any clause in the insurance contract entitling the lender to insurance proceeds, other claims, such as priority tax claims, may supercede the bank’s own right to insurance proceeds and leave it without full coverage for the balance due. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-9 (West 2012). See generally Alexander, Tax Liens, Tax Sales, and Due Process, 75 Ind. L.J. 747 , 770-71 & nn. 129-130 (2000).
The first two sentences of the relevant paragraph of the mortgage agreement (block quoted above) unambiguously give the bank the right to require more flood insurance by empowering it to require insurance in the amount it specifies for “any hazards.” A flood qualifies as a hazard, commonly defined as “an unavoidable danger or risk, even though often foreseeable.” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language 879 (2d ed. unabridged 1987). The third sentence is directed to what the government sets as a minimum amount of flood insurance for its own reasons and neither qualifies nor contradicts the right of the bank — explicitly reserved — to set a different amount that is higher than the government minimum.
Kolbe says that because the third sentence specifically deals with flood insurance, this specific provision should implicitly limit the first two sentences to exclude floods. But a specific provision trumps a general-provision only when the two are in conflict, so it is necessary to disregard or limit one or the other. See Farnsworth, 2 Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.11, at 297 (3d ed. 2004). Here, the two provisions are. consistent: one lists the bank’s requirements, and the other lists the government’s requirements and, since they are both minimum requirements, both can be met by flood insurance in the amount of the higher requirement.
Relatedly, Kolbe asserts that if the first two sentences are read to include floods, the third sentence will be rendered meaningless surplusage, a result that should be avoided because the third sentence uses the word “also.” But this too is false; HUD’s requirement applies even if the lender requires less or no flood insurance, and the reference to HUD’s requirements was specifically required by federal law, see 24 C.F.R. § 203 .16a(a)(2), which is presumably why they were made the subject of a separate sentence. Without some such warning, the bank would itself be subject to monetary penalties under the flood insurance regime. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(f)(2).
Kolbe argues that the phrase “any hazards” should be read to exclude floods because in the insurance industry, hazard insurance is traditionally seen as a category separate from flood insurance. The contention rests on a confusion about industry practice. Many homeowners’ hazard insurance policies, known as “all-risk” policies, cover against all physical risks unless specifically excluded, Thomas & Randall, New Appleman on Insurance Law § 41.02[l][a], at 41-15, § 41.02[l][a], at 41-15 (library ed. 2011), and then con *128 tain an express “flood exclusion” provision that excludes flooding and water damage from coverage, id. ch. 43, at 43-2, 43-14.
Thus, the standard all-risk policy does treat floods as a hazard but excludes it from the policy as a hazard that the policy does not choose to insure. Consider, for example, typical language of a flood exclusion:
We will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any of the following. Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.
... Water
... Flood, surface water, waves, tides, tidal waves, overflow of any body of water, or their spray, all whether driven by wind or not ...
In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 199 (5th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182 , 128 S.Ct. 1230 , 170 L.Ed.2d 63 (2008) (quoting policy language).
In other words, the standard policy excludes flood insurance, and relegates the insured to seek special insurance for floods, because the policy explicitly says that floods are not covered by the policy. By contrast, nothing in the loan agreement says that the bank’s authority to fix the amount of insurance for “any hazards” excludes floods. The reference to standard hazard policies, which do contain such an exclusion, is helpful to the bank and not to Kolbe — by confirming that “hazard” in-eludes “flood” unless expressly excluded— as if any such help were needed.
Similarly, while some HUD documents list “hazard insurance” and “flood insurance” separately, 25 this merely reflects the reality that because of the express exclusions in all-risk policies, a homeowner who wants flood insurance will have to obtain it separately. But the fact that a separate policy must be purchased is irrelevant: the mortgage holder has an explicit right to require increased insurance for “any” hazard regardless of how the policy for the hazard in question is packaged or procured. In fact, both the statute creating the federal flood insurance program and a handbook from the Federal Emergency Management Agency refer to “special flood hazards.” 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(a); Compl. ex. 2, at 4.
Turning to the good faith count, the governing law in New Jersey requires proof of bad motive for a claim of breach of the implied covenant. Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 , 773 A.2d 1121, 1130 (2001). Kolbe’s main position in the district court was that the contract by its terms limits the bank to the amount of flood insurance required by the federal government, so anything more is necessarily an act of bad faith. This claim depends on the premise that Bank of America breached the contract, which as discussed above, is self-evidently wrong.
On appeal, Kolbe now suggests that “the only reason Defendants demanded additional flood insurance was an improper effort to self-deal ... collecting for [them]sel[ves] or [their] affiliates insurance bro *129 kerage commissions and excessive premiums.” Appellants’ Br. at 14-15. The complaint contains no such allegation and so any such claim is forfeit. In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 533 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.2008). Anyway, as already noted, the bank has self-evident commercial reasons for wanting a margin of protection over and above the unpaid principal balance and it asked Kolbe to buy the insurance himself.
This appeal calls for little more than a per curiam affirmance of a plainly correct disposition by the district court. It is one thing to read ambiguous language in favor of the borrower; it is quite another to disregard clear language that has only one sensible reading supported by salient practical reasons for why that reading was intended. Language of the same ilk appears to be common in loan agreements. To let this case proceed will be the source of great mischief.
. National Flood Insurance Program: Mandatory Purchase of Flood Insurance Guidelines 27 (2007), http://www.fema.gov/library/view Record.do?id=2954. Replacement cost insur *127 anee has been endorsed as necessary to prevent ‘'underinsurance,” whereby property owners are left with insufficient resources to rebuild their property in the wake of a catastrophe. See generally Wells, Insuring to Value: Meeting a Critical Need (2d ed. 2007); Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market Inefficiencies in the Purchase and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y&L. 345 (2011).
. For example, HUD’s handbook on insured mortgages lists items that must be included in an escrow account, including "hazard insurance" and "flood insurance premiums.” HUD Handbook 4330.1, ch.2, § 2-1 (D), http:// portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc? id=43301c2HSGH.pdf. Similarly, HUD's guide brochure on settlement costs related to home purchases lists "Hazard Insurance Premium” and "Flood Insurance” as separate settlement costs. U.S. Dept, of Housing and Urban Dev., Buying Your Home: Settlement Costs and Helpful Information 16 (June 1997), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/ documents/huddoc?id=DOC_12893.pdf.
Combined text as published — syllabus, headnotes and all opinions in one document
United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
No. 11-2037 SUSAN LASS, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., and BAC HOME LOANS SERVICING, L.P., Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before Boudin, Lipez, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Kai H. Richter, with whom E. Michelle Drake, Nichols Kaster, PLLP, Thomas W. Duffey, and Keane, Klein & Duffy were on brief, for appellant. John C. Englander, with whom Matthew G. Lindenbaum, Dennis D'Angelo, and Goodwin Procter LLP were on brief, for appellees.
September 21, 2012 LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. Appellant Susan Lass is among a
number of homeowners in multiple states claiming that their
mortgage companies have wrongfully demanded an increase in flood
insurance coverage to levels beyond the amounts required by their
mortgages. In this case, unlike in the companion case we decide
today, Kolbe v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 11-2030, the pertinent
mortgage provision explicitly gives the lender discretion to
prescribe the amount of flood insurance. We nonetheless conclude
that the district court's dismissal of Lass's complaint must be
vacated. A supplemental document given to Lass at her real estate
closing, titled "Flood Insurance Notification," reasonably may be
read to state that the mandatory amount of flood insurance imposed
at that time would remain unchanged for the duration of the
mortgage. Given the ambiguity as to the lender's authority to
increase the coverage requirement, Lass is entitled to proceed with
her breach of contract and related claims.
I.
The following facts are drawn from the allegations in the
complaint. See Román-Oliveras v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 655 F.3d
43, 45 (1st Cir. 2011). Appellant Lass, a resident of Rehoboth,
Massachusetts, obtained a mortgage loan in the amount of $40,000 in
1994 from Residential Mortgage Corporation. Paragraph 5 of the -2- mortgage agreement,1 titled "Hazard or Property Insurance," states
in pertinent part:
Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the Property insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage" and any other hazards, including floods or flooding, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender requires. . . . If Borrower fails to maintain coverage described above, Lender may, at Lender's option, obtain coverage to protect Lender's rights in the Property in accordance with Paragraph 7.2
The amount of flood insurance required by the lender was specified
in a separate document labeled "Flood Insurance Notification" ("the
Notification"). It states, in part:
[A]t the closing the property you are financing must be covered by flood insurance in the amount of the principle [sic] amount 1 The mortgage agreement was executed on a standard form issued by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or "Freddie Mac") and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or "Fannie Mae") for single-family mortgages in Massachusetts. These two entities are "government-sponsored enterprises" ("GSEs")overseen by the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). 2 Paragraph 7 provides, in part:
If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument[,] . . . then Lender may do and pay for whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and Lender's rights in the Property.
Paragraph 7 also states that any costs incurred by the lender under the paragraph "shall become additional debt of Borrower" secured by the mortgage.
-3- financed, or the maximum amount available, whichever is less. This insurance will be mandatory until the loan is paid in full.
Federal law also required Lass to obtain flood insurance
coverage because her property is located in a special flood hazard
zone under the National Flood Insurance Act ("NFIA"). See 42
U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(1).3 The statutory coverage requirement is
framed in terms similar to the Notification. At the time of her
closing, Lass was obliged to purchase an amount of insurance that
tracked the lower of her principal balance or the maximum amount of
insurance available to her under the federal flood insurance
program ($250,000). Id.; see also id. § 4013(b)(2); 24 C.F.R.
§ 203 .16a; 44 C.F.R. § 61.6.4 Lass at all times maintained flood
insurance at least equal to the full amount of her loan, $40,000.
In 2007, she voluntarily increased her coverage to $100,000.
The rights to Lass's mortgage eventually were acquired by
Bank of America ("the Bank"),5 and shortly thereafter, in November 3 Technically, the statute requires the lender to require the borrower to obtain the insurance. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(1). 4 The federal law requirement in fact decreases as the mortgage balance decreases, with the statute setting the minimum amount of insurance as the "outstanding" principal balance. There is no contention that Lass was required to satisfy the $250,000 "available coverage" prong, and we therefore do not further refer to that alternative in our discussion. 5 The Bank initially assumed the role of lender and BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. assumed the role of servicer. The two entities merged in 2011, and we thus refer to them collectively as "the Bank."
-4- 2009, the Bank sent Lass a form letter stating that the amount of
flood insurance on her property was inadequate and did not satisfy
"the terms of [her] mortgage/deed of trust and/or Federal law."
The letter stated that she needed an additional $145,086 in
coverage, so that she would have flood insurance in the same amount
as the hazard insurance that she had purchased, the latter amount
ordinarily reflecting the replacement value of the improvements on
the property. The letter stated that, if Lass did not obtain the
increased insurance by early January 2010, the Bank would purchase
it for her, perhaps through its affiliated entities and likely with
less coverage despite a possibly higher cost than insurance she
could buy herself. Lass contacted the Bank questioning the need
for more insurance, given her low principal balance,6 and was
incorrectly told that the new coverage requirements were mandated
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA").7 The Bank
sent a follow-up letter in mid-December, reiterating its intention
to purchase the additional insurance if Lass failed to do so.
In January 2010, the Bank purchased the additional flood
insurance on behalf of Lass, backdated to provide coverage as of
November 1, 2009, and it later charged her escrow account $748.10 6 By the time she filed this action, Lass's outstanding balance had decreased to less than $28,000. The Bank's demand that she increase her flood insurance by more than $145,000 would bring the amount of insurance to more than $245,000. 7 FEMA recommends such coverage, but the mandatory coverage requirements are set lower by the NFIA. See Section II.A. infra.
-5- for the premium. After notifying Lass in September 2010 that it
intended to renew the policy, the Bank purchased coverage in
November 2010 in the amount of $149,998, charging Lass's escrow
account $779.94. That second policy was replaced in March 2011
with a third lender-placed policy in the amount of $139,988,
resulting in a charge of $724.94 to Lass's escrow account. Lass
claims that the Bank or one of its affiliates received a commission
or "kickback" in connection with the latter two lender-placed
policies. Also in March 2011, however, following a television news
report about plaintiff's flood-insurance interactions with the
Bank, the Bank posted refunds to Lass's escrow account for the cost
of the first two lender-placed polices (also commonly known as
"force-placed" policies).
In April 2011, Lass filed a putative class action
complaint, later amended, alleging that the Bank had "unfairly,
unjustly, and unlawfully" forced her and other borrowers to
purchase excessive amounts of flood insurance and had improperly
profited through "kickbacks, commissions, or 'other compensation'"
paid in connection with the force-placed insurance. Am. Compl. ¶¶
3, 4. Her amended complaint contained five separate causes of
action, all of which the district court dismissed. The court
concluded that the mortgage agreement unambiguously entitled the
Bank to increase the required amount of flood insurance at its
discretion and, largely based on that determination, held that none -6- of Lass's claims survived. On appeal, Lass challenges the
dismissal of four claims: breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and
breach of fiduciary duty.8 She asserts that the mortgage and
Notification, in combination, at least created an ambiguity
concerning the Bank's authority to demand greater coverage and,
consequently, none of the claims should have been resolved at the
motion-to-dismiss stage.
II.
We review a district court's decision on a motion to
dismiss de novo. Román-Oliveras, 655 F.3d at 47 . In so doing, we
accept the facts as set forth in the amended complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Cunningham v.
Nat'l City Bank, 588 F.3d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 2009). We also may
consider documents incorporated by reference in the complaint,
including the mortgage agreement and the Notification at issue
here, as well as matters appropriate for judicial notice. See
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322
(2007); Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008).
A. Breach of Contract Lass's breach-of-contract claim depends on whether the
amount of flood insurance required at the time of the closing -- 8 Lass does not appeal the dismissal of her claim alleging violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (a), (b).
-7- the amount of Lass's loan -- was subject to change by the lender.
In arguing that the amount was fixed for the duration of the loan,
Lass points to the statement in the Notification that the insurance
required at the time of the closing "will be mandatory until the
loan is paid in full." The Bank, however, relies on Paragraph 5's
statement that flood insurance "shall be maintained in the amounts
and for the periods that Lender requires" in arguing that it had
the discretion to demand more insurance when, and if, it deemed
such an increase to be appropriate. The Bank asserts that the
Notification -- to the extent it is considered part of the mortgage
"contract" -- merely states that Lass must maintain the statutory
minimum amount of insurance for the duration of the loan, and does
not promise that the Bank will never exercise its discretion to
increase the insurance obligation. Lass's fallback position is
that the documents are at least susceptible to both interpretations
and, hence, ambiguous. The district court agreed with the Bank,
concluding that "[t]he notification can easily be read in
conjunction with the mortgage[,] which gives the lender the
discretion to set the required amount of flood insurance."
Thus, as in Kolbe, the question before us is whether the
district court correctly concluded that the plaintiff's mortgage
agreement unambiguously gives the lender the discretion to demand
an increase in flood insurance to an amount above the borrower's
initial obligation. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question -8- of law in Massachusetts. Bukuras v. Mueller Group, LLC, 592 F.3d
255, 261-62 (1st Cir. 2010) (citing Basis Tech. Corp. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 878 N.E.2d 952, 958-59 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008)).
Language is ambiguous "only if it is susceptible of more than one
meaning and reasonably intelligent persons would differ as to which
meaning is the proper one." Gemini Investors Inc. v. AmeriPark,
Inc., 643 F.3d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Citation Ins. Co. v.
Gomez, 688 N.E.2d 951 , 953 (Mass. 1998)) (internal quotation mark
omitted). In considering whether a contract is ambiguous, we read
the agreement "in a reasonable and practical way, consistent with
its language, background, and purpose." Bukuras, 592 F.3d at 262
(quoting Cady v. Marcella, 729 N.E.2d 1125, 1130 (Mass. App. Ct.
2000)).
Lass argues that the Notification is part of the contract
and should be considered along with Paragraph 5. The district
court acknowledged that the supplemental document "appears to be
part of the mortgage contract, similar to a rider, although it is
not listed in the mortgage as an incorporated rider." The Bank
disagrees, asserting that the Notification should not be considered
part of the mortgage because it does not expressly bind both
parties and requires only the borrower's signature. Moreover, the
Bank argues that the Notification "cannot be used to create
ambiguity in the interpretation of paragraph 5," noting that "when
reading distinct but related documents that concern the same -9- transaction . . . [construing such documents as one contract]
applies primarily in cases of uncertainty and cannot undo plain
language which makes perfect sense in context." Appellee's Brief
at 26-27 (quoting Happ v. Corning, Inc., 466 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir.
2006)).
The Bank's argument is unpersuasive. Paragraph 5 of the
mortgage gives the lender the discretion to fix the amount of flood
insurance, and the Notification was an essential part of the
transaction because it represented the exercise of that discretion
at the outset of the mortgage period. In effect, the Notification
completed the contract between the parties by specifying that, by
the time of the closing, Lass was obliged to obtain the amount of
flood insurance required by federal law, and no more. We thus see
no reason to depart from the well established principle that, when
the circumstances are appropriate, "instruments deriving from a
given transaction shall be read together." Gilmore v. Century Bank
& Trust Co., 477 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (noting
also that, in addition to "the formal factors that connect the two
agreements, . . . we lay stress on the sense of the thing"); see
also In re Olympic Mills Corp., 477 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2007)
(noting that, without evidence of a contrary intention,
"instruments executed at the same time, by the same contracting
parties, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same
transaction will be considered and construed together as one -10- contract or instrument" (quoting 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on
Contracts § 30:26 (4th ed. 1999))); Chase Commercial Corp. v. Owen, 588 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) ("[I]f the three
documents were in essence part of one transaction, they must be
read together to effectuate the intention of the parties.").9
Hence, our inquiry encompasses both the mortgage and the
Notification.
We begin by rejecting Lass's argument that the mortgage
form itself cannot reasonably be read to give the lender discretion
to modify the flood insurance requirement during the life of the
loan. Paragraph 5 refers to "the amounts" and "the periods" of
coverage required by the lender, and the use of the plural form
suggests the possibility of changing obligations over time.10
Indeed, if Paragraph 5 constituted the entire agreement on flood
insurance, the Bank would have a compelling argument that the 9 We recognize that, unlike the Notification, the documents construed together in some cases were signed by both parties to the transaction. We do not understand the principle to be limited to such circumstances. Here, as the district court observed, the Notification was "similar to a rider," and, as we have explained, it follows from "the sense of the thing" to treat it as part of the mortgage agreement. Gilmore, 477 N.E.2d at 1073 . 10 Although the language in Paragraph 5 of Lass's contract is not as explicit as Paragraph 5 in the current version of the standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac single-family form for Massachusetts, which explicitly states that the lender's insurance requirement "can change during the term of the Loan," see Am. Compl. Exh. 3, ¶ 5, the language applicable here nonetheless suggests comparable discretion.
-11- mortgage could only reasonably be interpreted to give it discretion
to increase the insurance obligation during the life of the loan.
As we have observed, however, the Notification is a
significant component of the analysis here. After setting out the
specific amount of flood insurance the borrower must obtain, the
Notification states that "[t]his insurance will be mandatory until
the loan is paid in full." The Notification does not identify the
specified amount as merely a mandatory minimum, and it says nothing
about the lender's discretion to change the insurance amount at any
point before "the loan is paid in full." We think it is plausible
that the original lender chose -- in an exercise of the discretion
afforded by Paragraph 5 -- to align Lass's flood insurance
obligation with the level of coverage deemed adequate under federal
law, and that it intended to make that amount the benchmark for the
entire mortgage period. We thus conclude that the Notification may
be reasonably construed to say that the specified amount is the
amount of insurance Lass was required to maintain until she paid
off her loan.
That construction is not, however, inevitable. As the
Bank argues, the "until the loan is paid in full" portion of the
Notification also may be reasonably understood as intended to
highlight the duty under federal law to maintain an amount of
insurance linked to the principal balance, regardless of the
lender's exercise of its discretion under Paragraph 5 to set a -12- different, perhaps greater amount. See 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(e)(1)
(requiring lender to inform the borrower of federal flood insurance
requirements).11 The fact that the mortgage holders preceding Bank
of America did not vary from the federally mandated starting point
does not necessarily signify that they believed they lacked the
discretion to do so, and their decision to keep the amount constant
would not divest the Bank of any discretion afforded by Paragraph
5.12 None of the parties' other arguments persuades us that
the mortgage is only reasonably construed to allow -- or not to
allow -- the increased coverage demanded by the Bank. Lass points
to the sentence in Paragraph 5 authorizing the lender to obtain
insurance to protect "its rights" in the property, and argues that
it is well established under Massachusetts law that a lender's 11 Of course, as noted earlier, the NFIA requires flood insurance in the amount of the outstanding principal balance, so the amount of insurance mandated by law would have decreased as Lass paid down her loan. 12 As in Kolbe, our dissenting colleague presents the Bank's interpretation of the mortgage language but fails to give due regard to the plaintiff's contrary perspective. For example, we agree that it would be difficult to construe the mortgage language itself to bar an increase in the required amount of flood insurance. The Notification, however, states that the flood insurance required at the closing -- which was in the amount of the loan -- "will be mandatory until the loan is paid in full." The fact that the mortgage permits changes in the flood insurance obligation does not mean that the requirement can be changed at will once the parties have agreed to a fixed amount for the life of the loan. The question here is whether the lender in fact agreed in the Notification to a fixed amount of coverage.
-13- rights are limited to the amount of the outstanding debt.
Regardless of Massachusetts law, however, Paragraph 5 allows the
lender to obtain coverage "in accordance with Paragraph 7," which
in turn gives the lender authority not only to protect its own
rights but also "to protect the value of the Property."13 We are likewise unmoved by the Bank's assertion that
limiting flood insurance coverage to the amount required at Lass's
closing is unreasonable given that FEMA recommends insuring for the
full replacement value of the property. See Fed. Emergency Mgmt.
Agency, National Flood Insurance Program: Mandatory Purchase of
Flood Insurance Guidelines 27-28 (2007), available at
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2954 (last visited
Sept. 18, 2012). As we noted in Kolbe, though replacement-value
coverage may be advisable, Congress in the NFIA appears to have
incorporated the view that it also would be reasonable for
mortgagees to require only an amount "equal to the outstanding
principal balance of the loan," 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(b)(1). Cf.
Hofstetter v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 751 F. Supp. 2d 1116 , 1127 n.3
(N.D. Cal. 2010) ("Simply because an agency recommends that lenders
maintain a certain amount of flood insurance coverage does not mean 13 To the extent the relationship between Paragraph 5's "Lender's rights in the Property" reference and Paragraph 7's right to protect the "value of the Property" is debatable, the uncertainty reinforces our conclusion that an ambiguity exists concerning the Bank's authority to increase the flood insurance requirement.
-14- that lenders have carte blanche to do so without regard to the
terms of their loan agreements with borrowers."). Moreover, as we
also pointed out in Kolbe, some lenders may choose to set a fixed,
minimum flood insurance requirement to make home ownership
accessible to more people.
Finally, as in Kolbe, we decline at this stage of the
case to apply the principle of contra proferentem to construe
Lass's mortgage against the Bank as the "drafter" of the agreement.
The mortgage itself is on the standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac form
for single-family residences in Massachusetts, and the record does
not reveal how much control -- if any -- lenders have over its
terms, or whether the language is properly characterized as
"prescribed by law." See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206
cmt. b ("The rule that language is interpreted against the party
who chose it has no direct application to cases where the language
is prescribed by law, as is sometimes true with respect to
insurance policies, bills of lading and other standardized
documents."); see also Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit
to Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1077 , 1085 (2007) ("The Forgotten
Benefit") (stating that "Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require that
loans they purchase be documented on their forms").14 Nor has 14 We note that the standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac form, which contains terms negotiated by consumer advocates, has been described as "exceptionally fair" to borrowers. See The Forgotten Benefit, -15- evidence been cited concerning the origin of the "Flood Insurance
Notification." The name and logo of the original lender appear at
the top of the Notification document, but the name is typed onto a
blank line in the body of the document in a manner consistent with
a standardized form. As in Kolbe, Lass may choose to raise contra
proferentem, as appropriate, upon further development of the
record.
We thus conclude that, taken together, the mortgage and
the Notification are ambiguous as to the lender's authority to
demand increased flood coverage on Lass's property. The district
court therefore erred by rejecting Lass's proposed construction of
the mortgage as unreasonable, and her breach of contract claim must
be reinstated. Cf. Arnett v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:11-cv-
01372-SI, 2012 WL 2848425, at **5-9 (D. Or. July 11, 2012) (denying
motion for judgment on the pleadings based on ambiguity of similar
language in mortgage and supplemental flood insurance document).
B. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Lass alleges that multiple aspects of the Bank's conduct
in demanding increased flood insurance breached the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that is implicit in every contract in
Massachusetts. See Uno Rests., Inc. v. Boston Kenmore Realty
Corp., 805 N.E.2d 957, 964 (Mass. 2004); Anthony's Pier Four, Inc.
72 Mo. L. Rev. at 1087; see also id. at 1085 ("The forms have been modified over the years, but they retain the consumer-friendly provisions negotiated in the early 1970s." (footnote omitted)).
-16- v. HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 820 (Mass. 1991). "[T]he purpose
of the implied covenant is to ensure that neither party interferes
with the ability of the other to enjoy the fruits of the contract
and that when performing the obligations of the contract, the
parties remain faithful to the intended and agreed expectations of
the contract." FAMM Steel, Inc. v. Sovereign Bank, 571 F.3d 93,
100 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Chokel v. Genzyme Corp., 867 N.E.2d
325, 329 (Mass. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Nile v. Nile, 734 N.E.2d 1153 , 1160 (Mass. 2000). To succeed with
a claim based on the implied covenant, the plaintiff must
"present[] evidence of bad faith or an absence of good faith."
T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat'l Bank, 924 N.E.2d 696, 706
(Mass. 2010) (stating also that "no evidence of an improper motive
. . . was presented at trial, and no facts presented at trial
support a finding of an absence of good faith"); see also Uno
Rests., 805 N.E.2d at 964 n.5; Nile, 734 N.E.2d at 1160 (stating
that a lack of good faith "may be inferred by evidence that the
[conduct] was unreasonable under all the circumstances"). Evidence
that the defendant acted "to gain an advantage for itself" can
support a claim for breach of the covenant. See T.W. Nickerson, 924 N.E.2d at 707 .
Lass's complaint advances seven grounds for the implied
covenant claim, among them the Bank's demanding more flood
insurance than required by federal law or the mortgage agreement, -17- its purchase at Lass's expense of backdated insurance, and
charging borrowers for commissions or "other compensation" for
itself or its affiliates. See Am. Compl., ¶ 75. In keeping with
our analysis in Kolbe, we conclude that these allegations of
"unfair[], unjust[], and unlawful[]" conduct are sufficient to
state a claim for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 3, 4. If the Bank demanded flood
insurance coverage that exceeded the requirements of federal law
and the mortgage for the purpose of increasing profits for itself
or its affiliates, or if it unjustifiably charged borrowers for
backdated coverage and commissions, its conduct would be at odds
with "the intended and agreed expectations of the contract," FAMM
Steel, 571 F.3d at 100 (internal quotation mark omitted).15 The Bank argues that Lass's allegations are merely
conclusory assertions that fail to establish a plausible claim for
relief. See Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12
(1st Cir. 2011). To the contrary, Lass points to specific facts
that, once developed with the aid of discovery, could support the
implied covenant claim: the Bank warned in its notice letters that 15 Although the demand for coverage beyond the amounts specified in the mortgage and the other allegedly unauthorized charges also provide the basis for Lass's breach-of-contract claim, her implied covenant claim does not depend on a contractual breach. Lass also argues that the Bank violated the covenant by "unreasonably exercising in bad faith any purported discretionary authority Defendants claim they were afforded under the loan and mortgage documents." Am. Compl., ¶ 75(4).
-18- the cost of force-placed insurance may include commissions, and the
Bank in fact purchased three policies at Lass's expense, two of
them through a Bank subsidiary;16 the first policy was retroactive
to a date before the first notice letter, meaning that the Bank
bought coverage for a two-month period of time that had already
elapsed; and the required amount of insurance was undisputedly
beyond the NFIA requirements, and perhaps beyond the terms of the
mortgage agreement as well.
In arguing that the backdating claim is without merit,
the Bank cites an unpublished decision upholding the purchase of
retroactive lender-placed insurance. See Webb v. Chase Manhattan
Mortg. Corp., No. 2:05-cv-0548, 2008 WL 2230696 , at *19 (S.D. Ohio
May 28, 2008). Although there may be circumstances in which such
a purchase is defensible, here the property already was covered by
$100,000 of flood insurance, an amount well in excess of the
outstanding loan balance.17 Moreover, whether a lender may purchase
force-placed insurance coverage during the 45-day notice period
required by the NFIA is a debatable question. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 4012a(e)(1), (2); Notice, Loans in Areas Having Special Flood
Hazards, 76 Fed. Reg. 64175 , 64179-64181 (Oct. 17, 2011). A 16 The renewal coverage purchased in November 2010 and the replacement policy purchased in March 2011 were both obtained through Balboa Insurance Services, Inc., a subsidiary of the Bank. 17 In Webb, the property was no longer covered at all when the plaintiff's policy lapsed. See 2008 WL 2230696 , at *19.
-19- fortiori, the propriety of procuring a policy back-dated to before
notice was given is uncertain.18 The Bank also emphasizes that the
premiums for the first two force-placed policies were refunded to
Lass, and she thus suffered no "backdating" damages. The
complaint, however, alleges that Lass "has not recovered a penny of
the monthly overcharges that she has been forced to pay (much less
interest on those overcharges)," Am. Compl., ¶ 41, and the
reimbursement thus does not negate the implied covenant claim.
The allegations of self-dealing arising from the possible
payment of commissions to the Bank or its related entities also are
sufficiently specific to withstand motion-to-dismiss scrutiny.
Lass asserts, inter alia, that the Bank purchased unnecessary
insurance, at her expense, to generate a commission for the Bank or
its affiliate.19 As noted above, her complaint alleges that two of 18 Lass's complaint cites and includes as an exhibit an article in American Banker magazine in which a spokesperson for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners stated that policies "'should not be back-dated to collect premiums for a time period that has already passed.'" See Jeff Horwitz, Ties to Insurers Could Land Mortgage Servicers in More Trouble, American Banker (Nov. 9, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_216/ties-to-insurers- servicers-in-trouble-1028474-1.html?nopagination=1&zkPrintable=1. 19 The allegations in the complaint include the following:
75. Defendants breached [the duty of good faith and fair dealing] by, among other things: (1) misrepresenting federal flood insurance requirements; (2) misrepresenting the requirements of Plaintiff's Mortgage and other mortgage agreements; (3) demanding and/or force-placing more flood insurance than required by federal law or necessary to protect their financial interest in -20- the force-placed policies imposed by the Bank were obtained through
its subsidiary Balboa. These allegations easily meet the threshold
for a viable claim. See, e.g., Abels v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1276, 1278-79 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (declining to
dismiss claim alleging breach of implied covenant where plaintiffs
asserted that defendant "engaged in self-dealing by purchasing
insurance from one of its own affiliates").
mortgaged properties; (4) unreasonably exercising in bad faith any purported discretionary authority Defendants claim they were afforded under the loan and mortgage documents; (5) imposing contractual requirements that did not exist or that exceeded the requirements disclosed in the relevant contracts; (6) charging borrowers sham "costs" for flood insurance that did not reflect the true cost to Bank of America and/or its affiliates (or kicked back to them) as commissions or "other compensation"; and (7) purchasing backdated insurance.
76. Defendants willfully engaged in the foregoing conduct in bad faith, for the purpose of (i) unfairly and unconscionably maximizing revenue from borrowers; (ii) generating commissions, interest, fees, and "other compensation" for BOA and its affiliates; (iii) providing a ready-made customer base for BOA's captive insurance affiliates; (iv) gaining unwarranted contractual and legal advantages; and (v) depriving Plaintiff and other Over-Insurance Class members of their contractual and legal rights to obtain a loan, extension of credit, or credit renewal (or maintain the same) without having to purchase flood insurance coverage in excess of the funds extended to them.
77. Bank of America's financial incentives in connection with force-placed insurance had led it "to force-place excessive insurance and overcharge consumers for policies that provide minimal benefit[.]" See http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/175_216/ties-to- insurers-servicers-in-trouble-1028474- 1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1 (last visited May 27, 2011).
-21- Hence, as in Kolbe, we conclude that Lass's complaint
alleges sufficient facts to establish a breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing that is "'plausible on its face,'"
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The claim must
therefore be reinstated.
C. Unjust Enrichment To succeed with an unjust enrichment claim under
Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
received, was aware of, and accepted or retained a benefit
conferred by the plaintiff "under circumstances which make such
acceptance or retention inequitable." Vieira v. First Am. Title
Ins. Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 282, 294 (D. Mass. 2009); see also Cmty.
Builders, Inc. v. Indian Motorcycle Assocs., Inc., 692 N.E.2d 964,
979 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) ("The benefit must be unjust, a quality
that turns on the reasonable expectations of the parties." (citing
Salamon v. Terra, 477 N.E.2d 1029 (Mass. 1985))). Lass focuses
this claim on the Bank's allegedly unjust retention of commissions
earned in connection with the force-placed insurance, and asserts
that such commissions were improper whether or not the Bank had
authority to purchase the additional insurance.
The Bank argues that there cannot be an unjust enrichment
claim when there is an existing contract governing the same subject
matter. Alternatively, it maintains that any benefit "retained"
-22- could not be inequitable because Lass had notice of the
ramifications of failing to purchase additional flood insurance.
Neither of these arguments justifies dismissal of Lass's unjust
enrichment claim.
Although the Bank is correct that damages for breach of
contract and unjust enrichment are mutually exclusive, see Platten
v. HG Bermuda Exempted Ltd., 437 F.3d 118, 130 (1st Cir. 2006)
("Massachusetts law does not allow litigants to override an express
contract by arguing unjust enrichment."), it is accepted practice
to pursue both theories at the pleading stage, see, e.g., Vieira, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 294-95 (noting that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(d) "permits Plaintiffs to plead alternative and even
inconsistent legal theories, such as breach of contract and unjust
enrichment, even if Plaintiffs only can recover under one of these
theories"). The Bank argues that this flexibility in pleading does
not apply where, as here, the parties agree that there is a valid
contract between them. The mortgage, however, does not explicitly
address either commissions or, more generally, the Bank's
entitlement to profit from its forced placement of insurance.
Paragraph 7 states only that "the Lender may do and pay for
whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and
Lender's rights." Although Lass may be able to challenge the
payment of commissions to a Bank subsidiary as unnecessary and thus
a breach of Paragraph 7, we need not reject her equitable claim for -23- reimbursement now on the ground that she is limited to the contract
remedy. The case will in any event move forward, and the district
court will be in a better position once the record is more
developed to determine whether the unjust enrichment claim should
survive.20 Little need be said about the Bank's assertion that any
retention of a benefit was not inequitable as a matter of law
because Lass knew the consequences of failing to obtain additional
insurance on her own. If the mortgage did not permit the Bank to
force place insurance in an amount greater than the amount of
Lass's loan, the Bank's decision to do so -- with attendant benefit
to itself -- would seem to fit any notion of "unjust." Lass is
thus entitled to proceed with the unjust enrichment claim.
D. Breach of Fiduciary Duty Finally, Lass claims that the Bank had a fiduciary duty
in connection with managing her escrow account and breached that
duty by charging her for excessive flood insurance and related
commissions. The Bank does not contest the existence of a duty,
but argues that no breach occurred because the mortgage agreement
permitted it to purchase the insurance and impose the costs through 20 The NFIA states that the lender "may charge the borrower for the cost of premiums and fees incurred by the lender . . . in purchasing the [force-placed] insurance." 42 U.S.C. § 4012a(e)(2). We do not read this authorization for "fees" -- presumably paid to third parties -- as necessarily authorizing "commissions" paid to a Bank subsidiary. The latter might support an allegation of self- dealing, while the former would not.
-24- the escrow account. Our discussions of the other claims inevitably
lead to the conclusion that the dismissal of the fiduciary duty
claim also was premature. As we have described, the mortgage
agreement may not have authorized the forced placement of the
additional $145,000 in flood insurance coverage. Moreover, Lass
alleges that the Bank, in an act of self-dealing, improperly
accepted commissions for itself or a subsidiary in connection with
acquiring the additional insurance. Thus, as with the other
claims, the claim for breach of fiduciary duty must be reinstated.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court dismissing plaintiff's complaint is vacated, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs are awarded to the appellant.
So ordered.
– Dissenting Opinion Follows -- -25- BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. On February 18, 1994,
plaintiff-appellant Susan Lass obtained a loan of $40,000 secured
by a mortgage on her home in Reheboth, Massachusetts, the mortgage
then being immediately assigned to Shawmut Mortgage Company. The
form agreement, used for mortgages in Massachusetts guaranteed by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, provided in pertinent part:
5. Hazard or Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the Property insured against loss by fire . . . and any other hazards, including floods or flooding, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender requires. . . . If Borrower fails to maintain coverage described above, Lender may, at Lender's option, obtain coverage to protect Lender's rights in the Property in accordance with paragraph 7. . . . 7. Protection of Lender's Rights in the Property. If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, . . . then Lender may do and pay for whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and Lender's rights in the Property.
Another provision of Lass' mortgage provided that when
making monthly mortgage payments, Lass would also pay for separate
items, including property taxes and insurance premiums. The lender
would hold these payments, called "escrow items," in an escrow
account to cover such items when they were due.
On the same day that the mortgage was executed, Shawmut
provided Lass with a separate document on company letterhead -26- entitled "Flood Insurance Notification" (the "Notification"). This
document informed Lass that her property was located in a "special
flood hazard area" and that she would need to purchase flood
insurance in the following provision:
[A]t the closing the property you are financing must be covered by flood insurance in the amount of the principle [sic] amount financed, or the maximum amount available, whichever is less. This insurance will be mandatory until the loan is paid in full.
Both the just quoted notice and the requirement that
Shawmut provide such notice to Lass are imposed by federal law in
aid of the government's subsidized flood insurance program. 42
U.S.C. §§ 4104a(a)(1),(a)(3) (2006). Failure to provide such
notice would have subjected Shawmut to a federal monetary penalty.
Id. § 4012a(f)(2). This coverage mandated by government directive
is required whether or not the lender requires insurance coverage
for flooding or any other hazards.
At some point prior to November 2009, defendant-appellee
Bank of America or one of its affiliated entities (for convenience
we refer only to Bank of America) acquired Lass' mortgage. Then,
pursuant to paragraph 5 of the mortgage, Bank of America sent Lass
on November 16, 2009, a form letter requiring her to purchase an
additional $145,086 of flood insurance, which would insure her home
up to its full replacement-cost value. The letter said that the
bank would purchase the insurance if Lass failed to do so within -27- seven weeks, but it urged that she buy it herself to avoid a more
expensive purchase by the bank.
Despite a follow up bank letter, Lass failed to increase
her coverage. The bank then obtained the insurance itself for the
period in question, while offering Lass a refund of any duplicative
premiums if she belatedly bought the insurance elsewhere, but Lass
again declined to do so. The same pattern--warning, refusal by
Lass and purchase by the bank of the additional insurance--occurred
in 2010, and the bank offered her a further opportunity to purchase
her own insurance after it extended the policy in 2011. In each
instance, the bank took the premiums out of the escrow account.
Lass responded with the present lawsuit against the bank
on April 1, 2011.21 As amended, her complaint charged breach of
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and a count
for violation of a federal statute that is not at issue on appeal.
On the bank's motion to dismiss, the district court dismissed all
of Lass' counts, ruling that no claim had been stated. Lass v.
Bank of America, N.A., No. 11-10570-NMG, 2011 WL 3567280 , at *8 (D.
Mass. Aug. 11, 2011).
The explicit language of the mortgage entitled the bank
to require Lass to purchase the additional insurance even though it 21 The lawsuit is premised on the third of the three sets of forced insurance and the increased mortgage payments resulting from it, the bank having refunded the charges for the first two.
-28- would exceed the unpaid balance of the loan. Under the agreement,
Lass had to maintain insurance against "loss by fire . . . and any
other hazards, including floods or flooding, for which Lender
requires insurance," and this shall be "in the amounts and for the
periods that the Lender requires." It is hard to imagine how the
obligation could be more clearly expressed.
Lass relies upon the separate "Flood Insurance
Notification" furnished by Shawmut on the day the mortgage was
signed, advising her that she had to provide flood insurance to
cover the "principle [sic] amount financed, or the maximum amount
available, whichever is less . . . until the loan is paid in full."
But the agreement says explicitly that flood insurance "shall be
maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender
requires," indicating that the lender can require a different
amount in a later period (emphasis added).
The separate Flood Insurance Notification, establishing
specific minimums (because the government so requires), does not
purport to qualify this unequivocal obligation to maintain any
hazard insurance in the amounts and for the periods the lender
requires. Nor does the Flood Insurance Notification in any way
conflict with or contradict this obligation: it merely establishes
a government required minimum for flood insurance regardless of
whether the lender requires insurance in a lesser amount or in no
amount at all.
-29- Nor does the provision allowing the bank to purchase
insurance "to protect Lender's rights in the Property" require that
the insurance be limited to the unpaid balance. By virtue of its
provision of the loan and the risks of nonpayment, the lender has
an interest both in the loan amount and in the stream of interest
payments; both give it ample reason to insist on insurance that
goes beyond the unpaid balance of the loan and up to the
replacement cost. This is a practice is recommended by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency and not at all unusual.22 Because the loan agreement explicitly allows the lender
to increase the amount of flood insurance and to purchase the
insurance if the mortgagor refused, the bank's demand and purchase
cannot themselves violate the implied covenant. See Ayash v. Dana-
Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 684 (Mass. 2005) ("This
implied covenant may not be invoked to create rights and duties not
otherwise provided for in the existing contractual relationship."
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Nor can Lass argue that the 22 National Flood Insurance Program: Mandatory Purchase of Flood I n s u r a n c e G u i d e l i n e s 2 7 ( 2 00 7 ) , http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2954. See generally Wells, Insuring to Value: Meeting a Critical Need (2d ed. 2007) (advocating that property owners insure to the full replacement cost of property); Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market Inefficiencies in the Purchase and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 345 (2011) (suggesting that insuring to a value below replacement cost constitutes "underinsurance," a widespread problem caused by market inefficiencies).
-30- request for insurance up to replacement cost is extravagant or
irrational. See note 22, above.
As an alternative argument, Lass asserts--offering
various legal theories--that the bank charged an excessive amount
for the insurance, and did so to generate commissions for itself as
the purchaser of the insurance. Lass alleges that Bank of America charg[ed] borrowers sham 'costs' for flood insurance that did not reflect the true cost to Bank of America because a portion of such 'costs' were retained by Bank of America and/or its affiliates (or kicked back to them) as commissions or 'other compensation,' . . . [and that Bank of America did so] for the purpose of . . . generating commissions, interest, fees, and 'other compensation' for BOA and its affiliates.
Compl. ¶¶ 75, 76.
The bank repeatedly urged Lass to procure the additional
insurance for herself; indeed, she already had flood insurance and
could doubtless have increased her coverage--albeit for an
increased premium. Specifically, the bank sent Lass six letters
warning that bank-provided coverage might be more expensive than
insurance that Lass could obtain on her own and exhorting Lass to
buy her own insurance in terms such as "we urge you," "we continue
to encourage you," or "BAC Home Loans strongly encourages you."
Several of these exhortations were set off in boldface type for
emphasis. After each purchase, the bank even offered to cancel its
lender-placed insurance and refund any duplicative premiums if Lass
bought her own insurance.
-31- Thus, the bank unquestionably had a legitimate interest
in having the higher coverage to protect its loan and it repeatedly
urged that Lass buy it herself. Given these circumstances, the
notion that it sought the additional coverage so as to obtain the
commission is unsupported by any facts alleged in the complaint
that would make the "improper motive" charge remotely "plausible."
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Finally, Lass appears to claim that the bank overcharged
her for the insurance it obtained. Three theories are offered: the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, and a
fiduciary duty claim based on the fact that the bank drew on the
escrow account to pay for the added insurance. In principle one
can imagine that a bank, having properly insisted on replacement
cost insurance and properly invoked its right to buy the insurance
because the borrower refused, might nevertheless create liability
for itself by imposing exorbitant or manifestly unfair charges.
However, Lass' mortgage authorized the bank to fix the
level of insurance, purchase it directly if Lass refused, and pay
for it out of the escrow account, so all three claims would require
some factual allegations that pointed to a lack of "good faith and
fair dealing" in the price charged, T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet
Nat'l Bank, 924 N.E.2d 696, 704 (Mass. 2010)(covenant claim), an
"unjust" profit, Keller v. O'Brien, 683 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (Mass.
-32- 1997) (unjust enrichment), or unconscionable self-dealing, NRT New
England, Inc. v. Moncure, 937 N.E.2d 999, 1004 (Mass. App. Ct.
2010) (escrow claim).
The only relevant allegation in the complaint, quoted
above, amounts to saying that the bank obtained a commission on the
placement of the insurance. Placing insurance in exchange for
commissions is what independent agents do all the time, and the
bank can hardly place insurance without incurring costs of its own.
Calling these "sham" costs or kickbacks is pure rhetoric, or "bald
allegations" to which the district court was not required to defer,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 , especially because of the ease of pleading
real facts (if they existed).
Lass could have compared what the bank took out of the
escrow account as the cost of the additional insurance premium
including any commission with comparable insurance provided through
independent agents; possibly the discrepancies might have been
great enough to make it possible, absent adequate explanation by
the bank, to raise an inference that the bank was unduly profiting
or otherwise unreasonable in how it went about the placement of the
insurance. But the complaint provides nothing of the sort.
Finally, Lass complains that when the bank purchased
insurance for her in January 2010, it made the policy effective as
of November 1, 2009, charging her for over two months already
passed. The bank requested that she buy more insurance by letter -33- dated November 16, 2009, and the benefit of backdating the
insurance is itself unexplained. But the bank gave Lass a full
refund for the backdating policy before Lass initiated this
litigation.
To sum up, the lender's requirements in the loan
agreement as to hazard insurance were adequately, if not perfectly,
expressed (one has only to contrast paragraph 5 with the gibberish
typical in insurance policies); the bank's apparent choice to
insist on replacement cost as a matter of course is likely over-
rigid from a policy standpoint but that is a matter for regulators.
There is nothing to warrant further proceedings in this case.
-34-
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