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321 N.E.2d 787 Ohio Supreme Court January 8, 1975 No. 74-10
Although appellant has raised four propositions of law, the basic issue is whether a tortfeasor responding in damages resulting from the negligent treatment by a physician of the original injury caused by the negligence of the tortfeasor
Although a tortfeasor, pursuant to Tanner, supra, is liable for the results of negligent treatment by a physician of the injury caused by the tortfeasor, the physician is not responsible for the results of the negligence of the tortfeasor
However, the original tortfeasor is responsible for the negligence of the physician because the tortfeasor’s negligence created the risk (the injury) and the occasion for the independent negligence of the physician.
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255 P.3d 1064 Supreme Court of Colorado May 31, 2011 No. 09SC879
An unsuccessful outcome does not, by itself, mean that a physician was negligent. An exercise of judgment that results in an unsuccessful outcome does not, by itself, mean that a physician was negligent.
An unsuccessful outcome does not, by itself, mean that a physician was negligent. The Days' counsel objected to Dr.
Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 526-27 (S.D.2007) (opining that an instruction that stated that a physician was not necessarily negligent because the physician erred in judgment should not be given in ordinary negligence cases, but acknowledging
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190 N.E. 487 New York Court of Appeals April 17, 1934
A physical injury sustained through the negligence of one person may be cured by the skill of a physician, or aggravated through his negligence.
The negligence of the physician may then give rise to a cause of action against him, to recover the damages which the injured person would not otherwise have sustained.
In such case satisfaction by the original wrongdoer of all damages caused by his wrong bars action against the negligent physician who aggravated the damage. The law does not permit a double satisfaction for a single injury.
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917 S.W.2d 790 Texas Supreme Court March 7, 1996 No. 95-0852Cited by 112 Concurrence · Gonzalez
The Court assumes without deciding that the plaintiffs have a negligent referral cause of action against the referring physician.
(“[T]he referring doctor cannot be liable for the negligence of the doctor to whom he referred the patient, unless the referring doctor was negligent in recommending the second physician.”); Ross v.
(“[T]he referring doctor ... cannot be liable for the negligence of that other doctor unless the evidence shows that he failed to exercise reasonable care in recommending the second physician.”); Floyd v.
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196 N.E. 308 New York Court of Appeals May 21, 1935
Thus it appears that the claimant has sought from the insurance carrier, in an action for malpractice, damages caused by the negligence of physicians employed by the carrier which aggravated the result of the original injury, and he
A person who negligently injures another is not a joint tort feasor with a physician whose negligence thereafter aggravates the original injury.
More than that, these results would not have followed from the original injury but for the independent negligence of the physician.
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767 N.E.2d 125 New York Court of Appeals February 14, 2002Cited by 83 Dissent · Smith
Plaintiff alleged and sought to prove that the defendant doctor was negligent in ligating the renal artery during surgery.
The fact that there was a bad result to the patient by itself does not make the doctor liable. The doctor is liable only if he was negligent.
Whether the doctor was negligent is to be decided on the basis of the facts and conditions existing at the time of the claimed negligence.
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2009 Ohio 4175, 916 N.E.2d 1029 Ohio Supreme Court August 26, 2009 No. 2007-2202
a finding of negligence against the doctor.
WM-07-001, 2007-Ohio-5469, ¶ 18 (“Determining that staff physician negligence must be proven as an element of a negligent-credentialing claim against an employer does not interpose a legal requirement to name the staff physician
issue at trial when doctors and hospital were named parties, reasoning that “the matter * * * did not become ripe as to the issue of negligent credentialing until and if medical negligence was found on behalf of appellee [doctor]”
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187 N.E. 829 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court December 1, 1933
This is an action for alleged negligence, originally brought against a physician and after his death defended by his administrator.
The burden was on the plaintiff to establish a causal connection between negligence of the doctor and his injury; that is, to prove that an act or omission of the doctor caused the injury and also that such act or omission was negligent
This would not warrant the inference that the doctor had employed “.caustic” or that its use in such an operation was improper or negligent.
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382 So. 2d 702 Supreme Court of Florida April 3, 1980 No. 57815
Allegedly, her injuries were exacerbated by her doctor, who, it is claimed, negligently performed an unsuccessful laminectomy and fusion of Ms. Bissonette's spine.
The initial tortfeasor is simply trying to recoup his losses that in fairness should be shared with a negligent doctor.
Under this doctrine the financial burden is equitably apportioned among the responsible parties, and negligent doctors can no longer escape liability for their actions.
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189 S.E.2d 412 Supreme Court of Georgia May 3, 1972 No. 27008
in permitting the alleged negligent physician to practice his profession in the hospital, when his incompetency is known.
The mere fact that he was a licensed physician of the State of Georgia recommended by the other doctors on the staff as required by law does not overcome the averments that the hospital was negligent in failing to exercise care in
Paragraph 11 of the complaint merely charged the physician with negligence.
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141 S.W.3d 198 Texas Supreme Court July 9, 2004 No. 02-0090
In this case, the allegations in the pleadings raised both the possibility that the treating doctors were negligent in their administration of the drug and the possibility that the doctors’ association was negligent in the storage
’ association). 1 The patients alleged numerous negligent actions against the doctors’ association and its members, including negligence in “failing to properly secure anesthesia narcotics” and in “exposing patients to contaminated
Here, TPCIGA and American Indemnity agree that a claim for the doctors’ negligent administration of the anesthesia would be excluded from Utica’s policy.
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143 So. 251 Supreme Court of Florida August 2, 1932
and instruction of the physician or hospital throughout the treatment, and a poor result is obtained, or increased damages inflicted, because of the negligence of the physician or hospital, the negligence of the one who caused the
would have produced, or negligently aggravated the extent of the injury, the rule does apply.
of the original wrongdoer and a physician or hospital which *306 aggravates the injury, and no distinctly new injury is shown as the result of the negligence of the physician or hospital, such release covers and includes the injured
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383 P.2d 1005 Oregon Supreme Court July 15, 1963
But the. law also recognized the workman’s right to keep the two claims separate and to sue the employer for his negligence and the physician for the consequences of his malpractice.
physician.
We are aware of no reason why a negligent physician should not be held liable for his failure to have acted with reasonable care.
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889 S.W.2d 239 Texas Supreme Court June 22, 1994 No. D-3639
Claims that a physician or health care provider was negligent may not be recast as DTPA actions to avoid the standards set forth in the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act. Rhodes does not allege that Dr.
on the part of any physician or health care provider.
Commentators generally agree that section 12.01(a) bars DTPA suits against physicians and health care providers only if the cause of action is based on negligence. See, e.g., Richard M.
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145 N.W.2d 112 Wisconsin Supreme Court October 7, 1966
The verdict inquired whether the hospital was negligent in its nursing care and whether the doctors were negligent in their professional-medical care and treatment.
True, the question was too broadly phrased to include the defendant doctors because under the evidence any contributory negligence of Carson could not be set off against any negligence of the doctors.
Likewise, the questions on apportionment of negligence should not have included the doctors. However, this error was not prejudicial in view of the answers to the other inquiries finding the defendants were not negligent.
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407 S.E.2d 725 Supreme Court of Georgia September 4, 1991 No. S91A0802
Second, Humana contended that, even if the doctors’ non-negligence had not been conclusively established by the prior grant of summary judgment, the record established, without factual dispute, that the doctors had not been negligent
Johnson and Kendall on the ground they were not negligent conclusively established the non-negligence of the doctors, and that, as the Davises’ action against it is dependent on a finding that the doctors were negligent, the Davises
negligent.
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681 P.2d 1038 Supreme Court of Kansas April 27, 1984 No. 55,655Cited by 122 Dissent · Schroeder
The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of her doctors and on the part of Ortho.
Ortho objected to the dismissal of the physicians, and at trial sought to have their negligence compared.
It cannot be successfully argued the doctors were not negligent in the administration of this prescription drug, or in their treatment of this young plaintiff, after her blood pressure in December 1974 was diagnosed by them as high
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587 A.2d 1346 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania March 15, 1991 No. 5 W.D. Appeal Dkt. 1989Cited by 149 Dissent · Larsen
*555 If a doctor is negligent in saving a human life, the doctor pays. If a priest is negligent in saving the spirit of a human, the priest pays.
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283 N.W.2d 362 Supreme Court of Minnesota July 13, 1979 Nos. 48526, 48548
for which defendant doctor is responsible rather than from some other cause or some other person’s negligence.”
*368 Defendant hospital also argues that its negligence, if any, was superseded by the negligence of the doctors. The jury was not instructed on the law of superseding or intervening negligence, rather on concurring cause.
Here, the fact that the hospital’s duty continued towards plaintiff for as long as he stayed in the hospital, the fact that the doctors’ negligence was foreseeable, the possibility that the doctors’ negligence was brought about by
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423 N.W.2d 848 Wisconsin Supreme Court May 31, 1988 No. 87-0029
fact that the specific physician who committed the negligent act was an independent contractor.
Trinity, on the other hand, argues that a hospital’s liability should be limited to that stemming from negligence in selecting a physician and from the negligence of a physician who is an employee of the hospital.
According to Trinity, to impose liability when the treating physician is not a servant and the hospital has not been negligent in selecting the physician would make a hospital liable for all acts of negligence occurring within the
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